A FOURTH

LETTER

TO THE

People of *England*.

ON THE

Conduct of the M——rs in ALLIANCES, FLEETS, and ARMIES, ſince the firſt Differences on the *Ohio*, to the taking of *Minorca* by the *French*.

Jocerne tecum per littoras? civem mehercule non puto eſſe, qui temporibus his ridere poſſit; ita ſunt omnia debilitata jam prope et extincta.

CICERO.

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MDCCLVI.

A

LETTER

TO THE

People of *England.*

LETTER IV.

AT length the long predicted conſequences and fatal effects of m——l miſconduct, ſo much derided by thoſe who gave and thoſe who received the wages of iniquity, are become too alarming to be denied by the moſt hardy and inured to that pernicious practice.

Even thoſe who traffic in your undoing, acquieſce in this truth, and preſume to vindicate themſelves by aſſerting ye were found undone, when the ad———n was delivered into their hands, and that no remedy has ſufficient efficacy to ſave you from perdition.

The dire dilemma into which ye are brought, your diſtreſſed ſituation, the loads of accumulated taxes, the diminution of trade, the neglect of *Engliſh* welfare, the attention to *Germanic* intereſts, the reliances on foreign mercenaries, and contempt of *Britiſh* ſubjects for the defence of this iſland, the whole conduct of affairs, both at home and abroad, in *Europe* and *America*, and that deſpicable appearance to which ye are reduced in the ſight of every nation upon earth, render this too viſible to every eye the leaſt inquiſitive, and too afflicting to every heart not yet transformed to ſtone by the long practice of plundering its native land.

To avoid all appearance of inflammatory declamation, and ſilence the defamatory tongues of all who ſhare their country's ſpoils, who aſſert that every attempt to emancipate you from your evils, is a malignant deſign to depreciate the m——— y; let us impartially recall to your eyes the moſt material articles of the ad —— n, ſince the commencement of differences between the *Britiſh* and *French* ſubjects on the banks of the river *Ohio*.

In this place, the more effectually to lay before you the real cauſes of this war, it will be neceſſary to lead you back to a tranſaction not ſufficiently known by all of you, which paſſed between the m——y of *France* and *England*.

In the year 1750, or 1751, ſome *American* traders, ſubjects of the king of *Great Britain*, travelled to the borders of the *Ohio*, to traffic with the natives of thoſe parts. This being known to the *Canadian French*, meſſengers were diſpatched to acquaint them, that unleſs they withdrew from their maſter's territories, their effects would be confiſcated, and themſelves carried to priſon at *Quebec*. This meſſage the traders thought fit to obey, and withdrew in conſequence of it.

The ſucceeding ſeaſon, another company of *Britiſh* ſubjects came to trade on the *Ohio*, and not withdrawing on a like meſſage with the former, their goods were confiſcated, and themſelves carried priſoners to *Quebec*, from whence they were brought to *Rochelle* in *France*, and ſtill detained in priſon. Not conſcious of having violated the laws of nations, or traded on any ground to which the king of *Great Britain* had not an undoubted right, they remonſtrated to the *B——ſh* m—— y, inſiſted upon being claimed as *B——ſh* ſubjects, and honourably diſcharged from priſon, as perſons unoffending the laws of nations; nay, they entertained the honourable hopes of *Engliſhmen*, that the m——y of *E——d* would not ceaſe to demand an indemnification for the loſs of that merchandize which had been unjuſtly taken from them, and reparation for the inſult and long impriſonment of their perſons; expectations becoming men who value their liberties, properties, and nation's honour;

nour. In this they were deceived: the true ſpirit of an *En—ſh* m——r no longer dwelt amongſt us; the amb——r at *Paris*, inſtead of demanding theſe ſubjects of his maſter, as men unjuſtly held in priſon, and reparation for the injuries they had received, was ordered by the m—— y to ſollicit, as a favour from the court of *France*, the diſcharge of them only, acknowledging their offence. Were not your ſ —— n's rights, and your own privileges ſhamefully given up? Were not the lands on the *Ohio* confeſſed to belong to the king of *France*? Were not the *French* juſtified in impriſoning your fellow ſubjects, and confiſcating their effects, by this tame behaviour of the *B——ſh* m——r?

After this daſtardly conceſſion in thoſe whoſe duty it is to defend your privileges, can it be a wonder, that that country was claimed by the *French* as their own, or that they began to build forts and block-houſes to ſecure the trade, and aſcertain the property of it?

Little as this tranſaction was known or attended to in *E——d*, the taking poſſeſſion in this manner of the frontiers of *Virginia*, alarmed the people of that province; in conſequence of which Mr. *Waſhington* attacked them in thoſe parts, and was defeated.

It ſeems, however, that before this timid acquieſcence of the *B—ſh* m——r, in thus acknowledging that part of *A—— a* to be the property of *France*, he had granted the lands on the *Ohio* to a quaker of the city of *London*, and his aſſociates.

Thus caught between the king of *France* and a quaker, like the mariners of old between *Scylla* and *Charybdis*, he became unequal to the dangers and difficulty of the ſteerage, and fell into great embarraſſments.

He now perceived, that though he had puſilanimouſly given up to enemies his maſter's rights and your privileges, that the *French* miniſter, tenacious of both, and his own honour, could not be negociated into receding from what had been granted him: he perceived alſo, that the quaker, fortified by a pertinacious adherence to his own intereſt, could not be ſoothed into relinquiſhing the grant which had been made him. If the *French*

monarch was backed by the arm of fleſh, and 200,000 men to ſupport his claim to the *Ohio*, the quaker was ſuſtained in his by the ſpirit of obſtinacy, and intereſt of the legion of ſectaries. On one ſide a *French* invaſion and a war filled the m——r with horrid apprehenſions; on the other, he was greatly diſquieted, leſt, by the deſerting the quaker, he ſhould offend the money-jobbers of the city, and be unable to raiſe the ſupplies.

To ſtrengthen this dilemma of the m——r, there was added to the inſuperable propenſity in a quaker of never relinquiſhing an advantage, a ſecondary motive, which probably at that time eſcaped the ſharp-ſighted ken of our m——l Lynceus. The grant of the *Ohio*, however great it might be conceived, was a diſtant and problematical advantage only; a war on the continent of *America* was a preſent and poſitive one, as the remittances to the armies in thoſe parts, an object of great gain, would paſs through his hands, and by means of this money ſent to *America*, his debtors in that country would be enabled to diſcharge thoſe debts, which otherwiſe he entertained but little hopes of receiving.

Urged by theſe motives, this ſon of meekneſs and reſignation preſſed the m——r to ſend thoſe ſubjects, whoſe loyalty to their king, and love to their country, are above all fear of danger, to ſacrifice their lives in recovering the lands of men whoſe principles will not permit them to defend the cauſe, or fight the battles of their king or country.

Thus, at firſt, the want of ſpirit in the m——r, to vindicate his ſ——n's rights and ſubjects privileges, timidly beſeeching as a favour, what he had a right to demand in juſtice from the *French*, has given that nation a better foundation to the claim of the *Ohio*.

And, laſtly, the dread of being deſerted by money-jobbers and ſectaries, has prevailed over the terror of the *French* arms, and induced him to attempt recovering by force, what he had renounced by conceſſion: happy that nation which is deſtined to the a——n of ſuch conſiſtent m——rs.

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If it be asked, whence it comes to paſs, that this behaviour of the *B—ſh* m——r has never been mentioned in the *French* memorials relative to the diſputes in *America*, it may be anſwered, with truth, that the *French* miniſtry perfectly knew, that this ceding the territories of *England*, by the timidity of the m——r, was no legal relinquiſhing the *B—ſh* right to theſe lands, and that the K—g and people would never acquieſce in this conceſſion.

They therefore made no public uſe of this argument, reſerving it only between the *B—ſh* m——r and themſelves, leſt a public declaration of this affair might remove him from the ad————n, and the *French* monarch loſe an ally of greater conſequence to his ſucceſs, than any potentate in *Europe*; for what can impart ſuch ſtrength to an enemy, as the want of courage and capacity in the man who oppoſes him?

The *French* m——y had proved in a former war, and by long experience in peace, the inconſiſtency, inability, and timidity of this man. To theſe they were greatly indebted for their ſucceſs in the late war; on his diſpoſitions and capacity they preſumed to encroach upon us during peace; on the ſame qualities they promiſed themſelves the like advantages for the future. To diſcover his timid and abſurd behaviour was to riſque his removal, an event to be dreaded by all *French* ſubjects. They concluded, perhaps too raſhly, that as no nation ever had furniſhed two m——rs, ſucceeding each other, ſo unequal to the taſk of governing as this man, that therefore no nation could; and in conſequence of this manner of thinking, ſecreted this behaviour with reſpect to the *Ohio*, and choſe rather to make *Nova Scotia* the object of the quarrel to the public. This they determined to ſuſtain by arms, when they found themſelves defeated in argument.

After a moſt gracious ſpeech from the throne at the beginning of the ſeſſion, when all was gentle and pacific, on *Tueſday* the 25th of *March* 1755, the ſcene ſuddenly changes, war becomes the univerſal converſation, and a meſſage was ſent from his m——y to both houſes, importing that

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the preſent ſituation of affairs required an augmentation of his forces by ſea and land, to defend his juſt rights in *America*, and repel whatever attempts might be made againſt his kingdoms; not doubting but his faithful p——t would enable him to make ſuch augmentations as the emergency of affairs ſhould require.

To this meſſage both houſes preſented very loyal addreſſes, expreſſing their utmoſt zeal and affection for his majeſty's royal perſon, family, and government, aſſuring him of a ready compliance in ſupporting him to repel all attempts which may be made to diſturb, or deprive him of his kingdoms.

Let us now ſee what proviſion has been made in defence of all parts of his m——y's dominions by his m——r, in conſequence of this reſolution of hoſtilities. Mr *Braddock* had been juſt ſent to *Virginia* with *Engliſh* forces; the fatal effects of that expedition, the weakneſs of the deſign, and ineffectual execution of it, have already been been laid before you.

The defeat of that officer being accompanied with his death, a miſtake, not inferior to the firſt choice of this commander, was diſcovered to every eye; it ſeems there was no officer amongſt the remaining military force which had been ſent to *America*, equal to a command of ſuch conſequence.

The m——r then, who planned this expedition, muſt have concluded that Mr *Braddock* was both invincible and immortal; otherwiſe, as a diſeaſe might defeat all the ſucceſs which the greateſt courage, prudence, and capacity might atchieve, and the *French* arms prevail by the loſs of a general whom death only could conquer, he would have ſent a ſecond, equal to the task of commanding an army. My reaſon for ſaying this, is, that when opportunity had proved, contrary to m——l wiſdom, that this general was neither invincible nor immortal, the command did not devolve on any officer ſent from hence with Mr. *Braddock*.

Now to me it ſeems, that nothing can be a more convincing proof of the m——r's imagining Mr *Braddock* ſuperior to death and defeat, and of the ſuppoſed inſufficiency

ficiency of all the officers who accompanied him, than the command in chief falling on g——l *S——y*.

This gentleman had been bred at the bar, and was grown old in the practice of it; by unforſeen accidents he at laſt became g———r of a province in *New England*; he had never been preſent at ſiege or battle, and his talents, however nicely adapted to his profeſſion of the law, and other departments of a g———r, promiſed but little ſucceſs in the management of military affairs, being by nature ſlow, diffident, and inert. Him, notwithſtanding, the *E—ſh* m——r ſelected to command the king's armies in *America*, accompanied with the appointments and pay of the late duke of *Marlborough*.

It is remarkable alſo, that the m——l choice falling on this gentleman, proved a more favourable circumſtance to our enemies, than could have happened in the appointing of any other *American* governor. What a ſurpriſing genius for deviating from the right, is this nation bleſt with in a m——r!

The character of every other governor in *America* being unknown to the *French* court, whoever beſides had been appointed g——l, they might probably have concluded, that as he ought to be, ſo he was, equal to the command of an army. This would, at leaſt, have made our enemies leſs ſanguine in their hopes of ſucceſs; but Mr *S——y* was as well known at *Paris*, where he reſided a long while com——y for ſettling *Nova Scotia*, as in *London*; ſo that the *French* miniſtry being perfectly acquainted with his talents, the apprehenſions of danger from ſuch a commander, were but little in their minds, or in thoſe who were to oppoſe him.

Nay, ſo full were the *Pariſians*, on the news of his being appointed commander in chief in *America*, that the firſt ſalutation amongſt thoſe who were acquainted with him was, *Que penſez vous monſieur, le miniſtre d'Angleterre a nommé notre ami monſieur* S——y *general des armies du roy en Amerique*.

Notwithſtanding this appellation of friend by the *French*, I am convinced it did not ariſe from any prevailing inclination imagined in g——l *S——y* towards

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that nation; nor would I be thought to blame him for accepting this poſt, ſo honourable and lucrative; to have refuſed it, would have been an unexampled inſtance of ſelf-denial; an expectation not founded in the nature of man: nothing is more natural than to imagine ourſelves equal to every undertaking which our ſuperiors conceive us to be; without this prevalent and encouraging ſelf-opinion, the m——r muſt have long ſince reſigned his charge.

In conſequence of being deſtined to the chief command, Mr *S*——*y* repaired to *Albany*, where, after long imitating the celebrated *Fabius* in delay, he, at length, with the ſame deliberation began his march, counting his ſteps, towards the *Lake Ontario*, where being, alas, too maturely arrived, and perceiving that nothing was to be done againſt the enemy, he as deliberately marched back again, meeting no oppoſition which he did not eaſily overcome: and thus began and ended the expedition of g——l *S*——*y*, exactly as it had been predicted by all who knew him, imitating the great *Lewis* in going up the hill and coming down again. In this, however, the whole blame reſts on him who choſe, and not on him that was choſen; the g——l ſurely is to be pardoned who failed in his expedition, when the m——r was ſo much miſtaken in his judgment of him.

Notwithſtanding this manifeſt deficiency in the *B—ſh* m——y, in the choice of their generals, that of the *Americans* was as remarkably juſt. General *Johnſon*, formed by nature for the military art, whom ſagacity blended with courage, activity with patience, rendered what is not always to be found amongſt ſeen-ſervice and regular bred warriors, was the object of their choice.

This gentleman, with the militia of the provinces, took the *French* general priſoner, and defeated ten times the number of thoſe *French* troops, before which Mr *Braddock* and his regulars ſhamefully retired; and though this military ſucceſs was followed by no farther advantage to the *American* cauſe than that of taking priſoner the enemy's general, it muſt be imputed entirely to the jarring councils of the different provinces, delay in ſend-

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ing proviſions and recruits, envy of his ſucceſs, and various other cauſes.

Let us now turn our eyes on what was tranſacted in another part of *America*. It ſeems the inhabitants of *New England*, being thoroughly acquainted with the importance of *Nova Scotia*, had reſolved to drive the *French* from their forts in that part of *America*. With this view general *Winſlow* and 2000 militia ſailed for *Halifax*, where being arrived, and joined by about 2 or 300 regulars only, under the command of Col. *Monckton*, they took *Beau ſ jour*, and immediately all the other forts ſurrendered.

Thus the only advantages which were derived from all the military preparations againſt the *French* in *America*, were affected by a general unknown to the *B——ſh* m——r, and a militia of *Americans*, and by an expedition planned by the provinces of *New England*, the laſt of which exploits the *Americans* had always in their power to accompliſh, unaſſiſted by men, money, or ſhips, from this iſland: whilſt the generals and the expeditions appointed by the m——r were either ignominiouſly defeated, or rendered ineffectual.

The laſt ſummer then was productive of the reduction of *Nova Scotia*, Mr *Braddock*'s defeat, Mr *S——y*'s ineffectual march to *Oſwego*, general *Johnſon*'s victory unpurſued through deficiency of powers, and his relinquiſhing the ſervice through diſguſt.

The campaign being terminated ſo little to the advantage of the *Americans*, the moſt natural thought which could employ the attention of a ſtateſman, was that of ſpeedily reinforcing thoſe parts againſt the *French* attempts, which would undoubtedly be more vigorous the ſucceeding ſummer than the former, as men and ammunition would be ſent them to ſuſtain the eſtabliſhments they had made on the back of the *Britiſh* ſettlements. Let us ſee what proviſion has been made, and how ſpeedily aſſiſtance has been tranſmitted to your fellow ſubjects in thoſe parts, from whence the great ſource of your wealth and commerce is derived.

The firſt attempt in their favour was that of creating a regiment of *Germans* to be enliſted in *Europe*, and ſent thither; whoſe officers were to be compoſed of men ſtrangers to this land, and aliens to its liberties and privileges, unproved by experience, guiltleſs of ſiege or battle, in whoſe favour the *Britiſh* ſubjects of untainted loyalty and approved courage were rejected, and even an expreſs article, in an act relating to the ſettlement of the preſent auguſt family on the throne, was ſuſpended by a particular bill in parliament. Notwithſtanding all this, tranſacted in favour of foreigners, no advantage has hitherto accrued to the plantations from that deſign, neither men or officers being yet ſailed to that part.

The winter paſſed away, the ſpring was advancing! No g——l appointed! No *Engliſh* troops deſtined for the ſuccour of *America*, till on *April* 15th, the tranſports ſet ſail with *Otway*'s and *Murray*'s Regiments for *America*, too late to be of any aſſiſtance 'till next ſpring, unleſs the *French* may, peradventure, poſſeſs themſelves of *Virginia*, or ſome other ill defended colony, before their arrival.

In ſuch ſituation and diſtreſs as the provinces remained at the end of laſt autumn, when the deficiency of generals was ſo apparent to all comprehenſions, is it to be believed, that the commander in chief ſhould have been with held 'till the latter end of *May*? and yet this has been the real ſtate of the caſe.

That man, who was to ſuperſede all others in command, has not been ſent 'till it is probably become too late for him to perform any thing of conſequence this ſummer. The general in chief, who ſhould have been ſent laſt autumn, and been preſent in a new country as long as poſſible before his entering upon action, to be acquainted with the different reſolutions of the various provinces, to have known the genius of the inhabitants, planned the expeditions, and created a confidence in thoſe who were to obey him, was the laſt perſon diſpatched on this occaſion.

It is but lately that even any one has been ſent to *America*. Within two months Mr *Webb* has ſuperſeded Mr *S——y*, general *Abercrombie* Mr *Webb*, and lord *Loudon*,

Loudon all of them: by this deep contrivance, indeed, the m——r has fulfilled the ſcriptures, which ſay, the firſt ſhall be laſt, and the laſt firſt; yet without the imputation of infidelity, there are thoſe who cannot believe that the chief in command ought to be the leaſt acquainted with the buſineſs he is to undertake.

Is there another head in *Europe*, beſides the m——l, which would have ſent commanders in this manner? If lord *Loudon* had gone firſt, Mr. *Webb* and general *Abercrombie* would have followed naturally; and, as they were under him in command, fallen into their places of duty, which are to obey his orders and diſpoſitions; but as the m——r has deſtined the affair, the commander in chief muſt now follow the plans of men inferior to himſelf in military knowledge, or remain inactive; for certainly the preparation for every military expedition, muſt have been too far advanced before lord *Loudon*'s arrival, to admit of any conſiderable alteration; nay, even before Mr. *Webb* and *Abercrombie* arrived; ſo that Mr *S*——y is, in fact, general in planning the operation of this campaign alſo. How ridiculous then was this m——l diſpoſition in ſending out the commanders? Lord *Loudon* muſt, from the nature of his commiſſion, which ſuperſedes all others, be imagined ſuperior in every thing relative to the commanding an army, to all who were ſent before him; otherways it is the greateſt abſurdity to have ſent him at all; and yet, by pure ſubtilty of m——l contrivance, he muſt neceſſarily be the leaſt acquainted with what he is to undertake, if he arrives time enough for action this campaign; and bound to follow operations already concerted by a man proved unequal to the undertaking, or remain on the defenſive. Is not this cunningly ſubjecting a ſoldier and man of capacity to all the inſufficiency of underſtanding, in that very perſon who was ſo much complained of in the conduct of the laſt ſummer's campaign, and defeating the whole expedition for this year? Admirable ſagacity!

Beſides this inverſion of wrong for right, ſo natural to m——l underſtandings, in ſending the officers of higheſt rank, it is to be obſerved, that even the inferior officers

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of lord *Loudon*'s regiment, together with arms, amunition, and other military preparations, lie at this time * at *Portſmouth*; and, what is not a little extraordinary, the muskets, and other military weapons, lay a long while on the wharfs, waiting for tranſports, which were not then hired to take them on board. I ſay nothing of the ſagacity of that m——l conception, which ſhipped the carriages of the cannon on board one ſhip, the cannon on another, the ball on a third, and the powder on a fourth; a contrivance not eaſily to be paralelled in any ad——n. Hence, by this ſubtilty of thought, the chance of defeating the whole expedition was increaſed as four to one; for if each article had been proportionably mixed in the cargoes of the four ſhips, the taking one ſhip could have defeated but one fourth of the intention, and ſo in proportion; but, as it was deſigned, the taking one ſhip renders the whole uſeleſs; how complaiſant are the m——s in all their undertakings to your enemies?

To this might be added the 500 Barrels of gun-powder purchaſed untried of the *Dutch*, cunningly to prevent it's falling into our enemies hands; which, upon experiment, proved as exploſive as ſaw-duſt.

Theſe laſt mentioned affairs, however, muſt be conſidered as below the attention of m——s, whoſe capacities are ſo different from the common, and are only a farther confirmation of that great faculty of rightly diſtinguiſhing and ſelecting men, fit to be employed in all ſituations under their directions.

If deficiency in the ſupplies granted by parliament had been the cauſe of this delay, and inattention to the moſt valuable of all our foreign poſſeſſions, much might have been offered in vindication of a m——r; but ſince our moſt royal maſter, our moſt gracious ſovereign, in his moſt gracious ſpeech from the throne, has been pleaſed to thank his people for the vigorous and effectual ſupport, which has been granted him, what can be ſaid in defence of men, who have thus abſurdly applied it, ſhamefully neglecting the moſt important object of this kingdom? It would be ridiculous to name the cauſe of this delay;

* 12th of June.

delay; it must be assigned to that which no man in *England* is weak enough not to perceive, the m——r excepted.

If then superior knowledge of mankind be necessary in a m——r, to direct him in his choice of those who are to act under him; from these instances, not purposely selected, what hopes remain in you of him who always, undeviating, appoints the least qualified for the task committed to their care?

Having thus set before you the deficiency in m——l attention towards providing for the *American* colonies, without the commerce of which this kingdom must soon languish into a total decay, and shewn, that even the trifling succour hitherto designed since *Braddock*'s defeat, must, by the delay in sending it, be rendered ineffectual during this summer, let me now turn your eyes on what has been transacted in *Europe* during that time, in defence of *Great Britain* and *Ireland*, together with another dominion, not belonging to this crown, and which to the present minute has been no great source of acquisition to this nation.

In 1755, during the time which passed between the message to both houses, and the prorogation of p——t on the 28th of *April*, no addition was made to our land forces: no law passed to arm the subjects of *Great Britain* against any invasion from the *French*, a neglect which there is too much reason to fear may one day prove fatal to this kingdom; but great sums of money were granted, and the equipping a respectable navy engaged the whole attention of the adm——n.

His m——y having put an end to the session the same day, that no time might be lost, despising the menaces and invasions of the *French*, set out from *St. James*'s, greatly risquing his sacred person, through seas and tempests, to provide for the defence of his dominions. During his absence, let us recollect what were the occupations of the m——y at home towards this attainment: they were employed in committing violence on your liberties, depressing the courage of sailors by compulsion, manning fleets, which have been almost useless by their destination,

on, and leaving the iſland open to the hourly invaſion of the *French*, through deficiency of domeſtic force.

However, to the immortal memory of the m——r, this inattention at home was amply recompenſed by his care on the other ſide the water. Two treaties, ſuppoſed to be teeming with advantages to this nation, were concluded: one with the empreſs of *Ruſſia*, and the other with the *Landgrave* of *Heſſe-Caſſel*; the firſt ſigned at *Petersburgh*, the 30th of *September* 1755, the other at *Hanover* the 18th of *June* the ſame year.

The firſt article with *Ruſſia*, confirms the treaty concluded in 1744, by which the empreſs agrees to furniſh the king of *Great Britain* with 10,000 infantry, and 2000 cavalry, if his m——y's dominions ſhould be attacked, or with 500,000 rubles in money, yearly, during the attack. Neither of which having been demanded during the laſt rebellion in *Scotland*, it ſeems no unjuſt inference to conclude, that that treaty related to *H——r* only; otherwiſe, by what argument ſhall we juſtify our m—y, who, during that time of peril and expence, neglected to make that neceſſary requiſition of the troops, or money, in favour of *England*, ſtipulated in the treaty.

Theſe forces being deemed inſufficient in the preſent emergency, it was thought prudent to increaſe the number to 55,000, 40,000 of which, were to be infantry, and 15,000 cavalry; added to this, 40 or 50 gallies were to hold themſelves in readineſs to act on the firſt orders.

Beſides what has been already ſaid, relating to the treaty of 1745, which makes the baſis of this, the fourth article in the ſecond treaty with *Ruſſia*, confirms its being deſigned for the defence of *H——r* only.

It is there ſaid, that theſe troops and gallies ſhall not act except his *Britannic* majeſty or his allies are attacked; and then the commanding officer, *as ſoon as* he ſhall receive his majeſty's requiſition, ſhall make a diverſion with 30,000 infantry, and the 15,000 cavalry: and, at the ſame time, ſhall embark the other 10,000 infantry on board the gallies, in order to make a deſcent according to the exigency of affairs.

Now

Now, does not the ſecond article, by agreeing that thoſe troops ſhall be held in readineſs on the frontiers of *Livonia*, and the gallies cruiſing on that coaſt, declare the intention to be that of invading the *Pruſſian* territories, if the king of *Pruſſia* ſhall attempt any thing againſt the *H—n* dominions? otherways the ſtipulation, that the commanding officer ſhall make a diverſion with 30,000 infantry, and 15,000 cavalry, *as ſoon as* he ſhall receive his majeſty's requiſition, would appear a palpable abſurdity; becauſe theſe troops, which are to make this *immediate* diverſion in favour of his majeſty, cannot march into *France* in much leſs time than ſix months, if ſhe ſhould invade this iſland: this diverſion then, to be put in execution *as ſoon as* the requiſition ſhall be made on the part of *Great Britain*, cannot mean an attack upon *France*; much leſs can their marching to the aid of this kingdom be the intention of that article, unleſs the ſame m——r, who, twelve months ſince, did not know that *Cape Breton* is an iſland, had not at the time of concluding this treaty heard, that *Great Britain* is ſurrounded by the ocean.

Beſides this, gallies being unfit veſſels for tranſporting troops on the ocean, and the circumſtance of being ordered to make a *deſcent*, according to the exigency of affairs, with 10,000 forces, prove, that theſe alſo were deſigned to aſſiſt the former number, in whatever they ſhould attempt, and neither to invade *France* nor ſuccour *England*. The term *deſcent* being always underſtood in a hoſtile ſenſe, cannot well be intended to ſignify their coming hither as friends, and the number is too ſmall to attempt an undertaking of that kind on the ſhores of *France*.

In conſequence of this Agreement then for the defence of the e——l dominions, the empreſs of *Ruſſia* is to be paid by *Great Britain*, 100,000 *l.* annually, during the term of four years in times of peace; and as ſoon as thoſe troops ſhall paſs the frontiers of her country, 500,000 *l.* a year. In conſideration of this augmentation of her ſubſidy, the empreſs is to take upon herſelf the payment, ſubſiſtence, and tranſporting her troops, whereever they ſhall be ordered by *Great Britain*, and not to re-call

re-call them 'till the expiration of the treaty, though her own dominions ſhould be attacked,

This article of the treaty is yet another confirmation, that it excludes all idea of the *Ruſſians* being ever intended to defend this iſland; becauſe the pay of an equal number of *Britiſh* troops, in the ſame proportion of horſe and foot, would annually amount to 1,700,000*l.* Now is it poſſible to conceive, the *Ruſſian* empreſs can have agreed to ſupport thoſe forces in *England*, where proviſions are dear, on leſs than a third part of that ſum, and where the pay of each national ſoldier is but juſt ſufficient for his ſubſiſtence? Would not this be a kind of compact to ſtarve her own ſubjects? much leſs would ſhe oblige herſelf to the tranſporting them for the ſame money, which expence alone would conſume the whole ſubſidy.

Indeed, by the 11th, a truly Chriſtian article, it is agreed, that the *Ruſſians* ſhall have full liberty to plunder wherever they come; this auxiliary conſideration, as they would not fail to put it in execution, might probably prove an ample recompence for the ſmallneſs of their pay, after their arrival in *England*.

However, as I think it my duty to do juſtice to all mankind, weak as our m——l leaders may be; it appears, I own, too rank a contradiction, want of capacity, and inattention to their own intereſt, to have made a poſitive compact, that foreign troops ſhall interfere in the occupation and advantages peculiar to themſelves, of plundering the people of *E——d*.

Wherefore, from this article alone it ought to be concluded, that this treaty was made ſolely for the intereſt of *H——r*; and you the innocent ſubjects of *E——d*, were thereby doomed to a more ſevere fate than the Almighty impoſed on your firſt parents, who rebelled againſt his will; ye muſt now not only get your own daily bread by the ſweat of your brows, but even labour for the bread of others, who have no natural claim on you, and with whom ye have no connection. Thus the trade and toil of *Engliſhmen* muſt be annually employed in gaining

ing half a million of money for the ſole eaſe and ſafety of the ſubjects of *H——r*.

Notwithſtanding theſe proofs to the contrary, if any one chuſes to believe this treaty included any immediate reference to the aſſiſting this kingdom of *G——t B——n*, he has my full conſent, even then it will ſoon appear I imagine a ſmall juſtification of m——l proceedings.

Amongſt the many precautions which all wiſe m——s have obſerved in concluding treaties, there have been two from which they have never ſwerved; the firſt is, that in all ſubſequent treaties they have obſerved the ſtricteſt care, that no alliance with a weaker potentate, ſhall defeat the advantages of former treaties made with a ſtronger; without attending to this obſervation, m—— s leſſen their powers by every new acquiſition of allies, a ſubtilty not much unlike the denying the uſe of arms to the ſubjects of a kingdom, for their own defence during war, and truſting to hireling foreigners.

The ſecond is, that the honour and intereſt of the nation, which they ſuperintend, are to be the great objects of all m——s in their treaties with foreign nations. Without due regard to this obſervation, ſtates, like dupes at play, become the beggared object of ridicule to all crowned heads.

Let us now enquire, whether theſe two eſſential maxims have been judiciouſly purſued by the m——s of *E——d*, in their treaties with *Ruſſia, Heſſe-Caſſel*, and *Pruſſia*.

In order the more clearly to effect this, we muſt place things in the ſame ſituation they were before either of theſe treaties was concluded.

Before the concluſion of the treaty with the empreſs of *Ruſſia*, the m——s of *E——d* were under no ſmall apprehenſions of the *Pruſſian*'s laying hold of the growing differences between *G——t B——n* and *France*, and poſſeſſing himſelf of ſome of the electoral dominions. This his undertaking, though of no diſadvantage to *G——t B——n*, might prove, notwithſtanding, a moſt embarraſſing circumſtance, if a war ſhould break out on the continent, to the m——s of this nation, whoſe conſtant

purſuit it has been to prefer the *H——n* to *B——ſh* intereſts.

To diſengage themſelves from this perplexity, it was thought neceſſary to conclude the treaty as above ſpecified with *Ruſſia*; and indeed it muſt be acknowledged, that the proſpect of things, by this new alliance with *Ruſſia*, was greatly improved in reſpect to *H——r*. The *Pruſſian*, who before this ſubſidiary treaty with the *Muſcovite*, had entertained ſanguine hopes of enlarging his dominions, was now reduced to fear leſt his own territories might be diminiſhed by this new alliance.

This treaty then with *Ruſſia*, ſetting the intereſt of this iſland out of the queſtion, which it has conſtantly been for this forty years, whenever it came in competition with that of *Germany*, was truly beneficial to the electorate of *H——r*; it included the two advantages above mentioned, of increaſing power by alliance for the people it was intended, and honour to the m——s, if men can merit ſuch reward, who neglect the welfare of their own country to ſerve that of foreigners.

The 55,000 *Ruſſian* troops were undoubtedly an augmentation of the powers of *H——r* and its allies, as it ſubjected the *Pruſſian* king, their ſuſpected foe, and whoſe intereſts are as incompatible with the *Auſtrian*, as thoſe of heaven and hell, to no ſmall terrors on account of *Sileſia*, if the empreſs queen ſhould fix her heart on repoſſeſſing that gem, which had been plucked from her imperial diadem, and which ſhe ſtill beholds with longing eyes. At the ſame time then that the *Pruſſian*, by his dread of the *Ruſſian* arms, was rendered incapable of annoying the ele——l dominions; the friendſhip between *H——r* and the empreſs queen, who conſidered this treaty as made in her favour, was greatly ſtrengthened; particularly as the latter entertained hopes of their being employed in her ſervice in the recovery of *Sileſia*, if the *Pruſſian* ſhould intermeddle in the quarrel between the king of *G——t B——n* and *France*; or in *Flanders*, if the *French* ſhould attack that part of her dominions. Thus the *Pruſſian* king, by means of this treaty between *G—t B—n* and *Ruſſia*, was placed in that very anxious dilemma from which *H——r* had been juſt extricated.

This

This was the very ſituation in which it was the buſineſs of the *E—ſh* m——s to place and ſecure him, and to extricate himſelf as expeditiouſly as poſſible, was the great object of the *Pruſſian*: let us now enquire which of theſe has ultimately attained the ends of their endeavours.

No man ſaw more perſpicuouſly than the *Pruſſian* prince, how greatly the ſcale of advantages was turned in favour of *H——r* and *Auſtria*, by the treaty between *G—t B——n* and *Ruſſia*; he therefore ſet about deviſing ſome means, by which to relieve himſelf from this diſquieting dilemma; in conſequence of which deſign, from his own pure inclination, without overture from *E——d*, it ſeems, he propoſes a treaty between this kingdom and *Pruſſia*, which was ſpeedily concluded.

At this time it was, that the mercenary tongue-pads were let looſe in favour of the wiſdom of our m——s in the *Ruſſian* treaty; the ſalutary and humiliating conſequences which it had produced on *Pruſſia*, and the beneficial alliance which had been ſo long wiſhed, and at length completed between the two crowns. Let us now examine, whether this laſt treaty with *Pruſſia* has been productive of all thoſe bleſſings, which it was boaſted to have brought upon its wings; or whether like the drone it has not brought the ſting only without the honey.

The two moſt material articles in this treaty are, firſt, that *G—t B——n* with her allies, and *Pruſſia*, ſhall mutually aſſiſt each other in endeavouring to keep all foreign troops from entering the empire.

The ſecond, that *Great Britain* ſhall pay 20,000 *l.* as an indemnification for the captures of that merchandize which was taken on board *Pruſſian* bottoms, condemned and ſold during the laſt war; and in return, that *Pruſſia* ſhall pay the *Sileſia*-loan.

And here it ſeems evident at firſt view, that the whole benefit which might have accrued to the *Auſtrians*, and even to the *H——ns*, by this alliance with *Ruſſia*, was defeated by this ſecond treaty with *Pruſſia*. Becauſe, as by the *Ruſſian* treaty the *B—ſh* m——r had agreed to employ the *Muſcovites* in the empire of *Germany*, to the aid and intereſt of *H——r* and her allies; in this with *Pruſſia*, he

had moſt ſagaciouſly engaged to keep them from their aſſiſtance. And thus thoſe men, who valued themſelves ſo highly for concluding the treaty with *Ruſſia*, to bring her forces into *Germany*, were now artfully engaged by the king of *Pruſſia* to oppoſe the entrance of the very troops which they had hired in their favour.

By this ſingle article, did not the king of *Pruſſia* find himſelf quite extricated from all the difficulties in which the *Ruſſian* treaty had involved him?

If the empreſs ſhould attack *Sileſia*, he had now no other affair upon his hands but that of oppoſing her arms; becauſe the m——s of *G—t B——n* had by treaty agreed to keep out the *Ruſſians*, and free him from apprehenſions on that ſide; from this change of circumſtances, the empreſs-queen grew diſguſted with the *B—ſh* m——r; ſhe ſaw herſelf and her intereſts deſerted, her friendſhip and alliance rejected and renounced in favour of a weaker potentate: and from that time, being convinced of the weakneſs of the *B—ſh* m——r, entertained the idea of ſeeking the alliance of a ſtronger and wiſer power: thus *Pruſſia* has totally defeated the ſole advantage, which the *Ruſſian* treaty had given the ſtates of *E——d* and *H——r* over him, and this kingdom and the electoral dominions loſt the uſe of the *Auſtrian* powers, by preferring a weaker alliance to a ſtronger.

Let us now ſuppoſe that *France*, notwithſtanding this treaty between *G—t B——n* and *Pruſſia*, ſhould reſolve to attack the *H——n* dominions, what advantage can redound to that electorate from this convention between *G—t B——n* and *Pruſſia*, to oppoſe the entrance of all foreign troops into the empire? Will the m——s of this iſle and thoſe of *H——r* rely on this treaty with *Pruſſia*, and confide in the forces of that prince to prevent the *French* from invading the *H——n* dominions? or if they ſhould entertain this confidence, and act in conſequence of it, will the *Pruſſian* march his army in their defence, and give ſuch an opportunity to the empreſs-queen of recovering *Sileſia*, whilſt he is deſerting his own dominions, to fight the battles of *H——r*.

I imagine no man believes, either that the m——s would confide in *Pruſſia* on ſuch an occaſion, or that king deſert his own intereſts to follow thoſe of others.

If the *French* then, notwithſtanding this convention with *Pruſſia*, ſhould march towards the territories of *H——r*, it ſeems evident that the *Ruſſians*, according to treaty, muſt ſtill be invited to the aſſiſtance of the electoral dominions; in ſuch a caſe, of what contradictory and claſhing circumſtances will the two treaties appear to be compoſed?

The treaty with *Pruſſia* obliges the m——s to exclude the *Ruſſians*, and all foreigners, from the *German* empire; that with *Ruſſia*, to call them to the aid of the electorate into *Germany*.

Thus the *Ruſſian* troops, which, by the agreement with that empreſs, are to come as friends to the aſſiſtance of *H——r*, are, by the treaty with *Pruſſia*, to be oppoſed by thoſe very *H——ns*, as enemies.

In conſequence of this alliance with *Pruſſia*, if the *French* forces ſhould march to invade the electoral ſtate, and the *Ruſſians* to defend it, at the requiſition of our m——s, the *H——ns* are obliged by compact to become ſo many drawcanſirs, and kill both friends and foes.

By the alliance with *Pruſſia* they are engaged to keep out the *Ruſſians*; the moment then the *Muſcovites* begin to march, according to treaty, and the requeſt of our m——r, to the aſſiſtance of *H——r*, the treaty with *Pruſſia* obliges the *H——ns* to divide their troops with thoſe of that monarch, and march one half to reſiſt the coming of their allies the *Ruſſians*, and one half to reſiſt their foes the *French*: what an illuſtrious inſtance of refined and profound politics is here produced!

By this judicious proceeding, our m——rs have fairly diveſted the *H——ns* of the *Ruſſian* Aſſiſtance; for, if they rely on the alliance with *Pruſſia*, the *Ruſſians* cannot act in their favour; and if they claim the aid of the *Ruſſians*, one half of the *H——n* ſoldiers are, by compact with *Pruſſia*, obliged to join and oppoſe the very troops they call to their aſſiſtance.

In this manner, in obedience to treaty, the electorate will be deprived of one half of her troops wherewith to engage the *French*, becauſe they muſt be employed to oppoſe her friends the *Ruſſians*.

This muſt be the neceſſary conſequence of the treaties with *Ruſſia* and *Pruſſia*, if both are put into execution; for, unleſs the *H———ns* oppoſe the *Ruſſians* equally as the *French*, from entering the empire, the *Pruſſian* is entirely diſengaged from all obligation between him and the *B—ſh* m——rs, and the *H———ns* are the firſt infracters of the treaty. Wherefore, as it is impoſſible, from the nature of things, that the *H———ns* can oppoſe the *Ruſſians*, which they have called to their aſſiſtance, it follows, that the *Pruſſian* cannot act at all, becauſe he would injure the *H———ns* more, in oppoſing the *Ruſſians*, by calling off one half of the electoral troops, than aſſiſt them in oppoſing the *French*.

Thus the reſult of this boaſted wiſdom of the m——r, in the union between *G—t B——n* and *Pruſſia*, is at laſt no more than a dexterous deliverance of the latter from that peril he was fallen into by the *Ruſſian* treaty. He is at eaſe from all the fears which that alliance had imparted on the account of *Sileſia*; diſengaged from all obligation in his agreement with *E———d*, by the abſurdity of our m——s, and the almoſt impoſſibility of its being put in execution; and may not improbably, by virtue of this alliance, be ſupported againſt the houſe of *Auſtria*, by the very *Ruſſians* which our m——s originally had hired to oppoſe him.

Have they not then thus cunningly deprived themſelves of all the advantages which the treaty with *Ruſſia* had given them? Have they not, by renouncing the *Auſtrian* intereſt, diſpleaſed the empreſs queen; and, by this alliance with a weaker power, rendered themſelves leſs able to reſiſt the *French* arms in *Germany?* Have they not united the houſes of *Bourbon* and *Auſtria*, after having ſpent 300 millions to keep them aſunder? and to ſupport the latter in oppoſition to the former. Is it poſſible then, that thoſe m——s, who have been ſo eaſily circumvented by the *Pruſſian* king, could ever have perceived

ceived the force and efficacy of that treaty with *Ruſſia*? Ought not then the *Muſcovite* alliance to be deemed the pure effect of chance or malice (which the article on plundering ſeems to inſinuate), as that with *Pruſſia*, the legitimate child of ignorance and miſtake?

After having, in the above manner, ſhown the effects of the firſt article in the *Pruſſian* treaty, which, indeed, concerns the *H———n* welfare immediately only, let us conſider the conſequences of the ſecond article with reſpect to *G—t B——n*, in which the *B—ſh* m——rs agree to give 20,000 *l.* to the king of *Pruſſia*, in lieu of merchandize taken on board *Pruſſian* bottoms, condemned and ſold during laſt war; and that prince to pay the ſubjects of this iſland the remainder of the *Sileſia* loan.

Abſurd as the firſt article has been proved to be, this ſecond is not one ſtep behind it in miſtake and ridicule, and even before it in pernicious conſequences; for as that firſt article, by having united *Auſtria* and *France*, may now coſt this iſland two millions of money, in ſupporting the *Ruſſians* for the intereſt of *Pruſſia*, if *Sileſia* ſhould be attacked; ſo the ſecond article of the agreement bids fair to deſtroy all the commerce of *G—t B——n*, at leaſt all the advantage ſhe can draw from a ſuperior fleet in time of war.

The merchandize repaid for by this treaty, was what had been legally taken, condemned, and ſold. The equity of this proceeding had been defended, and our right juſtified, in a letter from the m——r to the *Pruſſian* court; and much more ſo in a memorial drawn by a lawyer and civilian, whoſe eminence and learning do honour to this nation. Nay, it was even aſſerted by theſe men, that the welfare and exiſtence of this ſtate, as a maritime power, eſſentially depended on our perſevering in our right to theſe captures; and this, I believe, is the opinion of all men of underſtanding in the nation.

Notwithſtanding which, in contradiction to all good ſenſe and ſound policy, reſtitution for theſe captures has been made to *Pruſſia*.

By

By this conceſſion, we either acknowledge that we have no right to ſeize military ſtores, deſigned for our enemies, on board neutral bottoms; that the decrees of that nation, on board whoſe ſhips they are taken, are valid, though contradictory to thoſe made in the courts of *G—t B——n*; or that our m——s are become ſuch timid and abject wretches, that whatever crowned head, however contemptible on the ſeas, ſhall dare to diſpute the legality of ſeizing and confiſcating ſuch ſtores, ſhall be repaid whatever his ſubjects may loſe.

I am ſenſible the m—s aſſert, that this 20,000 *l.* was not given to the king of *Pruſſia* as an indemnification for the captures made laſt war, but becauſe they had a mind to preſent him ſo much of that money, which you labour to procure for them to ſquander.

Is not this anſwer to the full as childiſh as the article is pernicious; like two boys at ſchool, where one gives the other money not to be beaten, and yet inſiſts it was not through fear but pure love. Does this excuſe him from the imputation of cowardice, or change the motive in the opinion of his ſchool-fellows? Will not he be inſulted by all the others as much as if he had confeſſed the true reaſon?

This illuſtrious inſtance of want of ſenſe and want of reſolution muſt have an advantageous tendency at the eve of a war. Will not the *Pruſſian* ſtill inſiſt upon the right of carrying ſtores in his ſhips to your enemies? Will not the *Dutch*, *Ruſſians*, *Danes*, and *Swedes*, with all the other maritime ſtates of *Europe*, demand, put in uſe, and ſupport the like privilege for themſelves, which you have already granted to the *Pruſſian?* and, if you oppoſe this liberty, will not your captures of their ſhips, however legal, draw the reſentment and arms of all *Europe* upon you?

What then is the advantage of the payment of the *Sileſia* loan, when compared to the dreadful conſequences of this conceſſion? How will you now diſtreſs effectually the commerce of your enemies, if your m—s permit neutral ſhips to tranſport and traffic, not only in the common produce and merchandize of *France*, and her colonies,

nies, but even in military ſtores, to the deſtruction of all your trade and ſecurity? will you longer vaunt your empire of the ocean?

Thus then, as by the former article, the m——rs of this k——m had effectually deſtroyed the good effects of the *Ruſsian* treaty with reſpect to *H——r*, in this they have given a fatal wound to the intereſt and honour of *G——t B——n*. Deſtined, as ye are, to labour for *German* welfare, how will ye ſupport the expence of thoſe millions which it muſt coſt, when the ſource of all your riches, your trade, is deſtroyed?

Now let me ask thoſe hireling trumpeters of the m——l wiſdom in concluding the *Pruſsian* treaty, what are the boaſted advantages which are derived from it to this kingdom? Is the concluſion ſtronger in favours of m——l wiſdom or m——l weakneſs? and what has this nation to expect under the direction of ſuch penetrating and all-ſeeing m——s who have, by two articles in one treaty, driven *Auſtria* from their intereſt, united her with *France*, adopted the weak alliance of *Pruſsia*, laid *H——r* open to *French* invaſion, deſtroyed the commerce of *G——t B——n*, and rendered our arms and councils contemptible in the opinion of all *Europe*?

Having thus, in ſome degree, explained the pernicious effects of the *Pruſsian* treaty, let us examine what advantages are likely to be derived to this kingdom from that with *Heſſe-Caſſel*, and what are the merits of the m—r in making it, and behaving in conſequence of its concluſion.

The great object of this treaty is, that either 8 or 12000 troops, as *G——t B——n* ſhall require, of which the ſixth part is to be horſe, are to be furniſhed by the *Landgrave* of *Heſſe* for this kingdom or her allies, and to be paid for by *E——d* only.

Now, as increaſing the ſtrength and ſuſtaining the honour of a nation ſhould always make the great objects of a m——r in his treaties with foreign nations; ſo frugality, in ſupporting and complying with them in the management of the public money, ſhould ever be inſeparable from every article.

Let us ſee whether this laſt duty of public parſimony has been more cloſely purſued in the alliance with *Heſſe*, than thoſe of power and honour were obſerved by that with *Pruſsia*.

By the fifth article it is agreed, that every trooper ſhall firſt be purchaſed at about 20 *l.* *Sterling*, and every foot ſoldier at about 7 *l.* which, in all, makes about 112,000 *l.* levy money; beſides this, the *Landgrave* is to have about 37,000 *l.* annually before the troops march; and, as ſoon as they march, he is to receive 74,000 *l.* annually, till they enter into pay according to that of *H———r* or *E———d*; at which time the ſubſidy returns to about 37,000 *l* annually; which again, when the troops are ſent back, is to return to 74,000 *l.* a year, during the whole duration of the treaty, which is four years.

In the mean time, whatever men or horſes die by diſeaſe, or are killed in battle, the beaſt is to be paid for at double the price of the human being; a bleſſed conſideration for the ſubjects of *German* princes!

In like manner, whatever arms or artillery ſhall be found deficient, or taken by the enemy, a full recompence is to be made by *G——t B——n* to the *Landgrave* of *Heſſe*.

By the tenth article, theſe troops ſhall be inſtantly ſent back whenever the dominions of the *Landgrave* ſhall be attacked.

Let us now, in obedience to the inclinations of the m———r, allow, that the *Ruſsians*, as well as the *Heſsians*, were by treaty obliged to come to the aſſiſtance of *G——t B——n*. It being at length determined, that *France* would certainly invade this iſland; that the *B—ſh* forces were unequal to the repelling a hoſtile invaſion; that the ſubjects of *E———d* ſhould not be armed in the defence of themſelves, their king and country; and that foreign mercenaries were neceſſary for our protection and ſafety; let us then explain with what admirable fore-thought, prudence, and oeconomy, the m———s have proceeded with reſpect to the ſecurity of this land in the requiſition of troops, according to the two treaties.

Fifty

Fifty five thouſand troops are, by compact with *Ruſſia*, to be ſent by the empreſs of that nation to aſſiſt *England*; theſe forces ſhe is to tranſport and ſuſtain for the annual ſubſidy of 500,000*l.* without any further conſideration for death of men and horſes, or loſs of military ſtores, and no return of them is to take place during four years, if the *Ruſſian*'s dominions ſhould be hoſtilely invaded.

Notwithſtanding theſe conditions of this treaty are ſo favourable in price and frugality, no requiſition of *Ruſſians* has been made in behalf of *G——t B——n*, but eight thouſand *Heſſians* are brought into *England*, the expence of which will amount this year, as the m——s confeſs, including levy money, ſubſidy to the *Landgrave*, death of men and horſes, tranſporting hither and back again, and pay, to a million *Sterling*.

Thus this military aid in *Heſſians*, coſting double the money that ſeven times that aſſiſtance would have done in *Ruſſians*, is fourteen times as expenſive: a plain proof how different the bargains are which are made between this nation and the *Germans*, and this nation and *Ruſſians*; and how much oeconomy in the public money, and the defence of this iſland, enter into the tranſactions of the m——r with *German* princes.

One article of frugality in the public money muſt not be omitted. Amongſt the troops landed in *E——d*, there are about 900 horſes, which, one with another, are not worth more than 4*l.* a piece; notwithſtanding which, each of theſe horſes has already coſt about 12*l.* levy money, and 9*l.* in being tranſported hither; after this, 12*l.* more is to be paid for each horſe which dies in the iſland; thus every dead *Heſſian* horſe will coſt this nation 33*l.* eight times the real value, and becomes to the *Landgrave* worth three times more dead than alive. Is it not then the intereſt of the *Landgrave*, and the duty of the commanding officer, to take ſpecial care that none of theſe cattle ever reviſit their native land; however, if any of them ſhould ſurvive, 9*l.* more are to be paid for the re-tranſportation of each; thus the hire of every *Heſſian* horſe, worth 4*l.* will then be only 30*l.* expence to you; not quite eight times his value.

From

From this article may it not be juſtly inferred, that our m——s are as unskilled in beaſts as men, and that this kingdom is the beſt market for *German* carrion in all *Europe*?

Another advantage attending the *Ruſsian* treaty, not to be found in the *Heſsian*, beſides number and cheapneſs, is, that the *Ruſsians* are by agreement obliged to remain here to your aſſiſtance, though the empreſs, their miſtreſs, ſhould be attacked.

Now, ſuppoſe the empreſs queen of *Hungary*, ſupported by this alliance with *France*, ſhould invade *Sileſia*; no improbable event, if the articles ſaid to be in the treaty between thoſe two powers are true; and at the ſame time the *French* ſhould attack the dominions of *H——r* or *Heſſe*, will not this iſland be then inſtantly diveſted of all foreign aſſiſtance from *Heſsians*, as theſe troops muſt inſtantly return to the defence of their prince: thus, as well in uſe as oeconomy, the m—l choice of *Heſsians*, who cannot tarry to your aid, in preference to *Ruſsians*, who are engaged to ſtay, is moſt egregiouſly conſpicuous and diſadvantageous to this kingdom.

This miſtake, or ſomething more criminal, in preferring the aid of 8000 *Heſsians* to 55,000 *Ruſsians*; and waſting a million of money for the ſeventh part of the aſſiſtance, which may be rendered uſeleſs alſo, one would have imagined might have been ſufficient to give the m——s an intimation of their error in the application of the treaties. Nothing appears to be leſs true; it being conceived, that the kingdom was not yet ſufficiently protected from *French* invaſion, it was agreed to requeſt the e——r of *H——r*, your dear ally, that he would be graciouſly diſpoſed to ſave this nation, by aſſiſting the king of *G——t B——n* with 8000 of his troops.

Here again the *Ruſſian* treaty was totally neglected. It was judged more eligible to apply for *H——ns*, at a freſh expence, than to make a requiſition of the *Ruſſian* troops. In conſequence of this opinion, the p—— t requeſted, and the kingdom was favoured with, 8000 *H——n* forces, which are ſince arrived. Does not this proceeding afford a freſh inſtance of m——l profuſion; for

though

though the ſum granted on this account is vaſtly ſhort of what the m——s confeſs will be the expence of the *Heſſians*, without the gift of prophecy one may venture to predict, that, at the concluſion, when the application of the million, granted by the vote of credit, comes to be ſpecified, this expence will be equal to that of the *Heſſians*; becauſe I am convinced, the great wiſdom and knowledge of the e——r of *H——r*, in concluding all ſubſidiary treaties, is in no ſenſe inferior to that of the *Landgrave* of *Heſſe Caſſel*. According to this way of reaſoning, 8000 *Heſſians* and 8000 *H——ns* may coſt two millions of money; four times the ſum of almoſt four times the number of *Ruſſians*. Add to this, the probability of the *H——ns* being leſs liable to tarry to your aſſiſtance than the *Heſſians*, as *H——r* will more likely be attacked than *Heſſe*, it may not improbably happen, that theſe two millions will be uſeleſsly waſted in ſubſidies and other expences on foreign troops, which cannot be of ſervice in protecting *G—t B——n*, whilſt thoſe that might be are entirely neglected and unrequeſted.

It was expected indeed, by every ſenſible and honeſt *Engliſhman*, that as the *Ruſſians* were now viſibly hired for the defence of *H——r* only, that the *H——ns* were to come hither in lieu of thoſe *Ruſſians*; and that, as *G——t B——n* now paid 55,000 *Muſcovite* forces to defend the ele——e, that the 8000 *H——ns* were to be at the ſame expence by way of exchange to protect *E——d*.

This ſuggeſtion, however reaſonable it may ſeem, proves by no means true in the event; for not only the *H——ns* as well as *Ruſſians* are paid by *G—t B——n*, but there is too much cauſe to ſuſpect, that yet another bargain is concluded for 8000 *Holſteiners*, ſince even the m——r had not the hardineſs to contradict that aſſertion, when he was called upon to be paid for with *B—ſh* money, that *H——r* may loſe no defence by the abſence of thoſe troops which are arrived to the aſſiſtance of *E——d*. What a ſtupendous inſtance is this again of m——l profuſion in favour of *German* ſtates and neglect of *E——ſh*: 500,000 *l.* annual ſubſidy to *Ruſſia*, added

added to a million for *H——ns*, tack'd to half that ſum, ſuppoſe for *Holſteiners*, make two millions of money for the feeble ſuccour of 8000 *H——ns*, to be paid by *E——d*, which troops after all, it is probable, may not tarry four months for the protection of this iſland.

Thus the preferring *Heſſians* to *Ruſſians*, at fourteen times the expence, is here again doubled, and the 8000 *H——ns* are choſen at the proportion of twenty eight times the coſt which was agreed to be given for the *Ruſſians*.

In this manner, the ſervants of the public, the guardians of your liberties and properties, the m——rs, have made three conventions in the place of one, neither of which, by this happy contrivance, will probably be of the leaſt importance or ſecurity to this iſland; unleſs rendering you poor and deſpicable, and dooming your hands to triple labour, for raiſing money to pay theſe foreign mercenaries, be a public benefit to this k——m.

Miſtaken, abſurd, and profuſe as this requiſition of *H——ns* and *Heſſians*, in preference to *Ruſſians*, may appear to be, it is not yet by ten thouſand degrees equally pernicious in its effects with that reſolution, which has been taken againſt permitting you, natives of *E——d*, to protect yourſelves, your king, and country.

By this act, the m——rs have ſubjected you, either to the invaſion of your enemies, or the arbitrary will of mercenary troops, invited hither under the notion of protecting you.

The militia bill, that neceſſary law, deviſed for entruſting arms to your hands, had for its objects the moſt laudable motives; defence of yourſelves, your k——n, and your country.

The ſecurity of theſe was to have been effectuated by a militia, conſiſting of 62,680 men, levied, cloathed, and paid by the trifling ſum of 175,197 *l.* and which the ſucceeding year would not have amounted to two thirds of that money; eight times the defence of the *H——n*, forces, and yet not one tenth part of the expence; including alſo in its favour, what no ſums of money can purchaſe,

purchaſe, the love of their king and country, animated by the defence of their wives, children, and properties.

This meaſure, ſo neceſſary in itſelf, which would have rendered you at the ſame time free from the fears of hoſtile invaſion, and the conqueſt of mercenary and pretended friends: this meaſure, reputable for the ſubject, parſimonious of public money, honourable to the m——r, glorious to the k——g, ſalutary to the conſtitution, and beneficial to the country, was rejected for inattention, profuſion, diſgrace, diſhonour, inſecurity, and ruin; freemen gave way to ſlaves, *Britons* to foreigners, liberty to thraldom: is there then the boſom of one *Engliſhman*, which ſtill remains unwounded with the idea of this ignominious treatment? accuſed as ye are of cowardice or diſloyalty; cowardice, if your loyalty is unſuſpected; diſloyalty, if ye are yet eſteemed a brave nation; diſloyalty to ſuch a ſ——n, as 'till this reign has never filled the throne of *E——d*. For what other reaſons can arms be withheld from your hands?

Since then your hands are denied the uſe of arms, ſtretch them empty as they are to heaven; though impotent with men, they may yet be prevalent before the Almighty. Ye are not yet denied the privilege of prayer, implore him to have that mercy on the *B——ſh* ſubjects which the m——rs have refuſed; that ſince by miſconduct, want of underſtanding, or iniquity, they have driven every powerful ſtate in *Europe* from your alliance, and by profuſion and denial of arms rendered you incapable of fighting for your prince, that heaven of its all-gracious favour will be pleaſed to preſerve and protect him yet to reign over ye a free and happy people; by this means alone it ſeems poſſible, that ye can be extricated from the numberleſs perils which ſurround you.

Having now, in ſome degree, placed the conduct of the m——rs in its juſt light, as it reſpects their behaviour in providing for *America*, *H——r* and *G—t B—n*, by land armies and treaties, let me turn your eyes on theadminiſtration of naval affairs, and candidly examine, whether ſymptoms of a more extenſive capacity and greater

greater prudence have appeared in conducting this part of the m——l province than in the former.

In *January* 1755, the preſs for manning the *B——ſh* fleet beganwith great violence. Scarce any age or quality preſerved the brave ſeamen from this violation of *B—— ſh* liberty; every dock-yard reſounded with innumerable ſtrokes of axes, caulking hammers, ſcreaking tackles, and cries of workmen. Pitch, tarr, and uproar, filled the towns of *Chatham*, *Portſmouth* and *Plymouth*; diſpatch, panegyric, and my lord——, were united in the mouths of all men! no time could furniſh an inſtance of ſuch capacity in the head of the ad—— as the preſent, and even the diligence of Mr —— at *Plymouth* dock, who had moſt amazingly, by means of thirty coopers made 100 tons of cask in twenty four hours, to ſupply admiral *Boſcawen*'s fleet, was attributed to the great ſagacity and foreſight of this great m——r in naval affairs.

And indeed it muſt be acknowledged, that the merit of this expedition in cask-making of the agent victualler at *Plymouth* dock, was as much due to this great naval m——r (of which he knew nothing 'till it was completed) as any other part of marine preparation.

The officers who preſide in the king's yards, have indeed a juſt claim to the praiſe of this kingdom for their diligence in equipping ſhips of war; to them, and to the great quantity of naval ſtores long laid in, it was owing that ſhips were ſo ſpeedily prepared for the ſea; for which reaſon, my ſacrilegious hand ſhall never rob the cottage of the deſerving man in low life, to decorate the palace of the undeſerving, to whom chance has given riches and titles; or erect a trophy to a l—d from ſpoils which common men have won.

A parrot which could have pronounced by authority, equip ten ſhips at *Chatham*, ten at *Portſmouth*, and ten at *Plymouth*, would as effectually and as ſpeedily have produced a fleet ready for the ſeas as the voice of the firſt l---d of the ad——y, and deſerved as great an encomium for the tranſaction.

The

The completion of the buſineſs was effected where he was not preſent, without one new invention, uncommon exertion, or peculiar attention of the underſtanding; and which, after the order had eſcaped his lips, whether he had been aſleep or awake, dreaming or pretending to think, in his eaſy chair or on horſeback, would have been equally completed in the ſame time.

Let us now examine, whether the man who has in this manner been extolled to the skies, as the beſt adapted for naval ad——n; by the merits of boatſwains, gunners, ſhip-wrights, and dock officers, and what he did not perform, has proved himſelf, in the execution of thoſe duties which belong to him in chief, equal to the poſt in which he has preſided; and deſerving that applauſe, which in the beginning was ſo liberally beſtowed upon him. To accompliſh this, permit me to enquire in what manner, and to what purpoſe, the fleets of *E——d* have been diſpoſed and deſtined, ſince the firſt naval preparations in *January* 1755.

The firſt inſtance in which the great knowledge of this preſident in maritime ad——n was exhibited to the public, was in that expedition in which Mr *Boſcawen* was ordered to intercept the *French* fleet, deſigned to carry and convoy ſtores to the aſſiſtance of *Canada*. The whole of this remarkable exhibition of knowledge in marine affairs, has been already explained in a firſt letter to the people of *E——d*; in which it has been proved, that the number of the enemy's ſhips was unknown to our ad——, or not attended to; that our fleet was inſufficient to the undertaking, if the deſtination of it had been, as it ought, before *Breſt*; becauſe *Macnamara*'s ſquadron was ſuperior to the *Engliſh* at his leaving that port; for the ſame reaſon had he continued his voyage to *America*, Mr *Boſcawen* and Mr *Holbourne*, by the weakneſs and diviſion of their fleets, would probably have fallen a prey to that of the *French*; and even as it did happen, though the fleet of *France* was rendered inferior to that of Mr *Boſcawen* by Mr *Macnamara*'s return to *Breſt*, all power of reaping any conſiderable advantage from it was defeated, by the *Engliſh* fleet being deſtined to cruize on

the banks of *Newfoundland* in thoſe months when that ſtation is covered with one general fog and darkneſs.

The *French* fleet being arrived in the river *St. Lawrence*, without any injury which could defeat the purport of their undertaking, the ſame genius which had ſo manifeſtly erred in the diſpoſition of every article in Mr *Boſcawen*'s voyage, was now determined to make ample atonement to his country for this deficiency of judgment, and by diſtributing the *E—ſh* fleet in ſuch a manner, that not a *French* ſhip of war ſhould eſcape it in her return to *France*, demonſtrate that he was yet equal to the ſupreme conduct of the *E—ſh* navy.

Mr *Boſcawen* being ordered home, Mr *Holbourne* was commmanded to cruize between cape *Breton* and the ſouth weſtern parts of *Newfoundland*, to intercept the *French* fleet returning from the river *St. Lawrence*, which ſervice he punctually performed. Now it was that the m——l advocates were extremely clamorous in their panegyrics on the deſtination of this fleet, and him who had ordered it; notwithſtanding which, it ſeems impoſſible to omit obſerving the parallelarity of judgment in this affair, between our firſt —— of the ad——--- and a juſtice of peace in the weſtern parts of *England*.

It ſeems ſome time laſt ſummer, a thief who had robbed, and been apprehended, a deſperate fellow, had eſcaped from before the juſtice, and flying to another houſe had bolted the door, and ſecured himſelf in one room of it. The conſtable, who had followed to this retreat, knowing the raſhneſs of the man, and the nature of his ſituation, conceived no ſmall apprehenſions of danger in attacking him in that place; he therefore with great prudence acquainted his worſhip with the circumſtances of the affair. The juſtice, after mature deliberation, wiſely conſidered it was impoſſible that the thief, was he ever ſo brave, through want of proviſion and other neceſſaries, could long remain in that poſt; he therefore ordered the ſiege to be turned into a blockade, and bade the conſtable and his aſſiſtants to tarry before the door; watch the door, *Tom*, ſays his worſhip to the conſtable,

ſtable, through that door he muſt come, therefore mind the door, and he cannot poſſibly eſcape us.

This being reſolved on, nothing could be more *alert* than the conſtable, and no men *in higher ſpirits* than his gang. The commander, as ſoon as it was dark, placed a lanthorn and candle at the door to ſee all that might paſs from or to the houſe, and during the whole night moſt manfully with his aſſociates ſtood on his arms, ready prepared, with his ſtaff in his hand, happily to demoliſh the thief the moment he ſhould pretend to ſally and eſcape him.

This duty being performed through the length of two whole days and two whole nights, the juſtice in momentary expectation of hearing that the thief was taken, and the conſtable haranguing the mob, which attended on the thief's perſeverance; at the ſame time wondering, that he had not been obliged to ſurrender thro' drought and hunger: when an old acquaintance of the beſieged arrived with intelligence, that he had met the thief the firſt morning after his confinement, at the break of day, twenty miles from that very houſe in which the juſtice had to that moment imagined he was cloſely ſhut up: in fact, the ſagacious head of the juſtice had never conceived, that, notwithſtanding a door may be bolted ever ſo ſtrong, and watched ever ſo diligently, a man might get out at the window, as it really happened in this very caſe.

In like manner, whilſt Mr *H——ne*, according to the orders of his ſuperior, was cruizing at the door between *Newfoundland* and cape *Breton*, aud the marine m——r believed *Dubois de la Mothe* ſtill confined and ſtarving in the river *St. Lawrence*, that ſly *Frenchman* ſlipt through the window, between the northern parts of *Newfoundland* and the continent, by the ſtreights of *Belliſle*, unſuſpected by the penetrating ſpirit of our firſt d—-r in marine affairs; ſo that he heard *de la Mothe* and his ſquadron were ſafely arrived at *Breſt*, before he knew he had quitted the river *St. Lawrence*.

Thus then, in the conduct of this naval tranſaction, there are to be found five very conſpicuous inſtances of

moſt conſummate ignorance; firſt the ignorance of the number of the enemy's ſhips; ſecondly, the inſufficiency of the *Engliſh* fleet; thirdly, their not being ordered to cruize before *Breſt*; fourthly, their being ordered to cruize where they could not ſee their enemy; and fifthly, to cruize between *Newfoundland* and cape *Breton*, to intercept a fleet which did not paſs that way.

This juſtice, however, muſt be done the marine m——r to his honour; the firſt ignorance of a proper ſtation for cruizing, preſerved the *Engliſh* fleet from the danger of the laſt ignorance of the number of the enemy's fleet, and inſufficiency of our own.

Notwithſtanding this uniform concatenation of errors, there are thoſe who attempt to juſtify this conduct, by ſaying it was impoſſible for Mr *Holbourne*'s fleet to attempt intercepting *de la Mothe*'s in both paſſages, becauſe his ſquadron was not ſufficiently ſtrong to ſuffer a diviſion for that purpoſe? Why then did the marine m——r expoſe himſelf to ridicule, in attempting to do that which he ought to have known muſt have proved ineffectual, and riſk the deſtruction of his maſter's ſhips, by rocks and tempeſts, in thoſe ſeas, where they could meet no adverſary and do no ſervice? did my lord *Winchelſea* ever conceive ſo fruitleſs an attempt, or commit ſo egregious a miſtake?

Hence then it may be gathered, that if hereafter any naval captain, indulged with five ſhips, at the expence of 500,000 *l.* of the nation's money, to make a fortune for himſelf, ſhall ſail round the globe, and by the very utmoſt effort of all poſſible chances, like throwing twenty aces on twenty dice the firſt time, take a ſhip worth a million of money for his and his company's advantage; that though he does not ſurround a weaker man than himſelf, he may yet preſide and direct the whole navy of *E——d* to the ruin of the kingdom.

Such *fatality*, according to the preſent faſhionable phraſe of excuſe, having attended the conduct of this naval expedition in every particular! a *fatality* doomed to attend inſufficient judgments nine times in ten, ſince the creation! a freſh inſtance offers itſelf, of reinſtating

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our marine m——r in the popular opinion, which began greatly to decline in his favour.

It ſeems monſieur *du Guay*, a *French* admiral, was arrived at *Cadiz*, with ſix ſhips of the line, in his way to *Breſt*. This admiral, and this ſquadron, the ſame naval genius, who had ſo wiſely deſtined the former fleet of *E——d*, was determined to intercept.

He remembered the errors which had been imputed to his charge in the deſtination of *Boſcawen*'s fleet, inſufficiency in force, and wrong appointment in the ſtation of cruizing; he was therefore determined to avoid theſe two miſtakes, at leaſt at this time. Accordingly, on the 18th of *July*, Mr *Hawke*, with eighteen ſail of the line, was ſent to intercept the ſix *French* ſhips under the command of *du Guay*; and with this whole fleet, ſo ſuperior to the enemy, to cruize off cape *Finiſterre*, 'till the *French* ſhips ſhould appear.

This exploit again was trumpeted forth by m——l hirelings, as an inſuperable proof of great marine knowledge in the director. The ſtation was happily choſen, the number of the ſhips ſufficient, and the game ſure. Here was nothing for the moſt malevolent diſpoſition to blame: envy muſt now be dumb, or, if it ſpoke, ſpeak in the praiſe of this deſign: and yet a miſtake, much like the former in its conſequences, prevailed alſo at this time; and in this manner it muſt prevail, when deſigns miſcarry, not from accidents, for which men of ſenſe may be pardoned in not foreſeeing, but from radical inſufficiency and underſtanding.

It ſeems that the ſame head, which had conceived that there was but one way of ſailing from *Canada* to *Breſt*, and had never thought of the ſtreights of *Belliſle*, had in this place imagined the ſea like *Hownſlow* heath, where a man may ſit on horſeback on one ſide and ſee what paſſes on the other, and that all ſhips which are ſteering to *Breſt* from *Cadiz*, are obliged to turn the corner at cape *Finiſterre*, like race horſes at a poſt, or loſe their voyage. Probably this great naval m——r had reaſoned much in the following manner: all ſhips, which have no enemy to fear or avoid, in their courſe from *Cadiz* to

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Breſt, make cape *Finiſterre*; wherefore, every ſhip which knows there is an enemy in the way, and has reaſon to be under apprehenſion of danger, will certainly ſail the ſame way; and therefore Mr *Hawke* ſhall be deſtined to cruize off cape *Finiſterre* to intercept them. Admirable inſtance of ſea logic! Without reaſoning in this manner, is it poſſible he could have deſtined the fleet as he did?

Monſieur *du Guay*, however, it ſeems, from the ſame principles, drew inferences diametrically oppoſite; and in order to avoid the uſual courſe which is ſteered from *Cadiz* to *Breſt*, ſailed directly weſt from *Spain* into the *Atlantic* ocean; when being at a great diſtance from the coaſt, he changed his courſe and ſtood directly for the land's-end of *E——d*. By this precaution of ſailing weſt to a great diſtance before he ſteered towards the channel, he paſſed on the outſide of all our fleet cruizing at cape *Finiſterre*; and arriving ſafely in the channel, fell in behind it with his ſquadron, and got ſafe into the harbour of *Breſt*.

Such was the event of this ſecond exhibition of boaſted marine knowledge! Avoiding the errors of the former conduct generated the very miſcarriage of this; and ſo it will for ever happen to men, who fancy, that by ſhunning the miſtakes of paſſed management they ſhall ſucceed in the preſent. Whoever does not intuitively diſtinguiſh right from wrong in the conduct of great affairs, can never be ſucceſsful by judging from parallelarity; becauſe, as in theſe two inſtances, tho' ſhips, ſeas, and the directing their ſtations, may be the whole concern in each, yet the ſimilarity in theſe objects create no reaſon, either to avoid miſtakes or purſue the advantages of a prior deſtination, where there is no reſemblance of circumſtances in the undertaking; and no two can be ſufficiently ſimilar, or ſufficiently unlike, to juſtify a parallel or oppoſite conduct in any director of them.

The duke *du Tallard*, as I have been informed by a gentleman who thoroughly underſtands military affairs, made the ſame diſpoſition at *Blenheim*, that the great *Guſtavus Adolphus* had done at the famous battle which he won againſt *Valſtein*; yet the *French* general was defeated, and the *Engliſh* triumphed. No circumſtances can be

be ſufficiently alike to juſtify ſimilar proceedings in men who are to direct. Imitators want force of underſtanding to penetrate, purſue, and put in action that which the original contrivers had conceived in various ways in laying down their plan. They are mimics of what was done, without comprehending the whole force of what might have been done: wherefore, in the progreſs of an action planned in imitation of another, when the circumſtances vary from the former, not ſeeing the reaſon of the deſign, they are unequal to the ſupplying what the original contriver would eaſily have afforded: knowing no more than the hiſtorian has delivered, they follow ſervilely like copyiſts, and are defeated. Had this marine m——r, in his deſtinations of theſe naval expeditions, judged from original lights and principles, he muſt certainly have imagined, that *du Guay* would have avoided the beaten tract in times of peace; he would therefore have divided Mr *Hawke*'s ſquadron into two equal parts, which making nine in each ſquadron, would have been ſtill three to two; a proper and ſuperior force wherewith to oppoſe monſieur *du Guay*; theſe, attended with ſmaller ſhips to have been uſed as ſcouts, by cruizing off cape *Finiſterre*, and in the other ſtation thro' which the *French* ſquadron paſſed, there being but theſe two ways of ſteering their courſes, without great ill luck, at leaſt without blame to the planner of the cruize, muſt have intercepted the *French* fleet in its coming to *Breſt*, and brought their ſhips into *Engliſh* harbours.

This however not being done, proves that the flying from error on one ſide, drives weak minds into an equal miſtake in the oppoſite extreme, as young ſpendthrifts frequently become old miſers.

Nor is it in matters of great moment only this inſufficiency of conduct appears: the ſloop which carried the field-equipage belonging to the officers of *Otway*'s regiment from *London* to *Plymouth*, becauſe the tranſports were ſailed before ſhe arrived at that port, was obliged to wait for orders to follow them.

The tranſports which the m——r had cunningly ſent to bring the *Dutch* troops over, before he knew they would

would come, like a booby who ſeeks a midwife before his wife is with child, after their fruitleſs and expenſive ſtay in *Holland*, ſailed for the *Heſſians*, when it was firſt diſcovered that no orders from the ad——— had been tranſmitted to juſtify the taking theſe troops on board. This neglect created this expenſive delay, 'til a letter could come from and return to that part of *Europe*; nay, even the *H———ns*, ſo very dear to this nation, were permitted to ſail hither without convoy, ſo that two twenty gun ſhips of *France*, might have carried them all into *Dunkirk* with great facility.

The ſuperintendency of our iſlands in *America*, is not one iota leſs remarkably provident. Monſieur *D'Aubigny* is too ſtrong for our fleet at *Antigua* and the *Leeward* iſlands, and monſieur *Perrier de Salvert* is in the ſame ſituation with reſpect to our fleet at *Jamaica*, notwithſtanding that admiral *Townſhend*, with his whole fleet of one ſhip, is ſafely arrived at that iſland.

In like manner, as the very ultimate of all ſound judgment had been diſplayed in the diſtribution of the cannon, carriages, powder, and ball, ſeparately on board the tranſports for *America*; ſo another exhibition of equal good ſenſe appears in ſending out the four commanders to the *Mediterranean*; for as by the ſagacity of dividing the ſtores, the chance of defeating the deſign was increaſed as four to one; ſo by confining all theſe four commanding officers to one ſhip, and not ſending them ſeparately, the chance is increaſed in the ſame proportion, that the whole deſign of their voyage may be fruſtrated alſo. War has been already declared two months, and no ſhip is yet ſent to give notice of it in the *Eaſt Indies*.

The judgments of our m——rs, like pendulums, being eternally vibrating from one extreme to another, paſſing through, yet not reſting in the mean, what hopes can ye entertain of reinſtating the happy ſituation from which ye are fallen? That which ſhould have been blended they have divided, and that which ſhould have been ſeparated they have united: and through the whole have proved themſelves the very antipodes to common ſenſe. Few men have been born with talents and abilities

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vaſtly ſuperior to the reſt of mankind, yet many have been well adapted to the knowledge and conduct of little things, who have been incapable of comprehending the effect and beauty of what is great and ſublime; like the fly which admired the poliſh of a mirror, and condemned the architecture of *St. Pauls*. The mereſt fribble of a virtuoſo, inſenſible to the great order of nature, can trace with delight and skill the various and minute ſhapes, ſhades, and colours, in a ſhell or flower, which diſtinguiſh one from another, but there appears in the ad———n of the preſent m——r in maritime affairs, an equal incapacity for the conduct of great and little matters; the ſame head which has ſo egregiouſly erred in the deſtination and appointment of larger fleets, has in like manner been inſufficient to the minuteſt duty of his office; one inſtance of the former, more conſpicuouſly flagrant than the reſt, now comes to be laid before you.

Since the beginning of laſt *January*, every news-paper has been replete with the great military preparations which were making at *Toulon*, the number of ſhips equipping, and ſoldiers marching towards that port, *Marſeilles*, and places adjacent. The object for which theſe forces were deſtined was as conſtantly mentioned: this ſubject was the common converſation of all ranks of men, from the artiſan to the peer; and all except the m———rs believed that *Minorca* would ſpeedily be attacked.

I don't mention accounts contained in news-papers as authentic relations which may warrant the m——l attention, but to ask that as at this time they have proved literally true, by what means it could come to paſs, that thoſe whoſe immediate duty it is to be informed of all tranſactions of ſuch a nature amongſt our enemies, ſhould be the only perſons unacquainted with them, or why they alone disbelieved the intelligence which gained credit amongſt all mankind beſides?

If the nature of this military preparation would have permitted a concealment of it, much might have been ſaid in vindication of the m———rs who gave no credit to the account; but ſince thouſands ſaw and declared it to all the nations upon earth, why were the m———rs dif-

ſident of, or unacquainted with it? an inſtance unexampled in any ad——n but their own. The number of *Macnamara*'s fleet had before been equally unknown or disbelieved; this then is the ſecond inſtance of fatal ignorance, defective intelligence, or arrogant disbelief of the force of our enemies.

By whatever arguments the m——rs might be ſeduced to diſcredit this military preparation at *Toulon*, the very probability of *Minorca*'s being attacked, and the eſſential importance which it is of to the *B——ſh* commerce, ought to have created a jealouſy in them, that the *French* would not long overlook ſo important an object, unattended to, and neglected as it was, by them. Theſe conſiderations alone, without giving credit to what was tranſacting at *Toulon*, made it their duty indiſpenſibly to have placed *Minorca* in ſecurity from all *French* invaſion.

Beſides theſe reaſons, there was yet another motive to the ſtrengthening that iſland from hoſtilities, and to the believing it threatened with an invaſion, the repeated requeſts for ſuccours from the brave commander of the caſtle of *St. Philip*. This gallant man, after reiterated letters to the m——rs, at length wrote to this purpoſe to his neareſt relation; "I have often requeſted ſuccours from the m——r, I have been as often promiſed to receive them, and as conſtantly diſappointed in the promiſe; this then will, I imagine, terminate in my falling a ſacrifice to their neglect; however, though it ſhould ſhorten my days a year or two, it will the ſooner put you in poſſeſſion of what I ſhall leave you, and in which I wiſh you happy."

Notwithſtanding the conſequence of that iſland to this kingdom, what had been publiſhed by the public, written by the governor, and believed by all mankind, no attention was paid to the protection of it. No land forces ſent, though the number within the fortreſs was known to be unequal to the duty and defence of it againſt a ſiege; and whereas in the year 1744 admiral *Matthews*, with a fleet of 48 ſail, 9 of which were three decked ſhips, was employed in the *Mediterranean*; now commodore *Edgecombe* with 3 Ships and 2 frigates only,

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was thought a ſufficient protection for the *Mediterranean* trade, and iſland of *Minorca*.

Whatever were the reaſons, no attention was paid to this important poſſeſſion? Whilſt all *Europe* beheld this neglect with amazement, and every true *Engliſh* heart trembled for the wound which he ſaw muſt be inflicted on his country, our m——rs were honourably engaged in laying wagers there was no fleet nor ſailors to man a fleet at *Toulon*; that if there ſhould be any it was not deſigned againſt *Mahon*; and treating with deriſion the apprehenſions of all who foreſaw the event, and whoſe love for their country would not permit them to be at eaſe; whilſt the honour of the crown, and the intereſt of the kingdom, were open to inſult and diminution, by this ſiniſter neglect, and the *French* attacking *Minorca*.

During this time our royal navy, full manned and prepared for the ſeas, was riding triumphantly at *Spithead*, and the head of the ad——y paid as an ad——l, abſent on leave, at the rate of a thouſand a year, as if all that had been done in honours and profits had been hitherto inadequate to his merit. Glorious picture of wiſdom in your m——rs! illuſtrious ancedote of their prudent ad——n, for their ſons to read hereafter, and curſe their ſires! but happily providence, in commiſeration to this people, has denied that bleſſing to the moſt conſpicuous of them, kindly refuſing to their wiſhes that progeny, which, treading in their fathers footſteps, muſt ſtill be baneful to this iſle.

At length, after four months paſſed in m——l inattention, and in wonder by gazing multitudes, Mr *Byng* ſet ſail on the 5th of *April* from *Spithead*, with ten ſhips of the line for the *Mediterranean*.

During theſe months of inattention and neglect, *La Galiſſoniere*, with twelve ſhips of the line and five frigates, with tranſports ſufficient to carry 15,000 men, ammunition, and artillery for a ſiege, commanded by the *Duc de Richelieu*, were gotten ready, and ſailed from *Toulon*; and on the 18th of *April* landed in the iſland of *Minorca*, eight days after our fleet weighed anchor from *Spithead*, and almoſt ſix weeks before they arrived near *Mahon*.

Mahon. The confirmation of the *French* deſcent on *Minorca* was the firſt intelligence which demonſtrated the truth of what all men believed except the m——rs, and of what they had neglected in not ſending ſuccours to *Mahon.*

Pernicious as this delay of ſending ſuccours now appeared to every eye, it was not yet irremediable, tho' the troops were debarked, the citadel was not yet taken, and the avowed bravery of the commander juſtified the belief, that no ſhameful ſurrender of the fortreſs would ſtain the laſt moments of his life. Notwithſtanding which, it was confidently aſſerted by the m——rs and their hireling ſpouters, that *La Galliſſoniere*'s fleet conſiſted only of eight ſhips of the line, and that Mr *Byng* would blow them out of the water.

Here was an opportunity to be envied of retrieving all the reputation which had been forfeited by the firſt neglect, in not ſending a ſufficient force to oppoſe the enemy's deſcent on *Minorca.*

Men of genius, though hitherto deluded or miſtaken, would have improved this overſight into an advantage, and by reinforcing the ſquadron under Mr *B——g*, with a number of ſhips equal to that with which he ſet ſail, would have defeated the *French* fleet and ſtarved their troops in *Minorca.* By preventing military ſtores, they would have ſaved *St. Philip*'s, and by preventing the arrival of proviſion, have obliged the whole army to have ſurrendered priſoners of war.

How capable then was the firſt neglect of being converted to the glory of the king and kingdom? but, alas! they knew not the ſtrength of that very citadel, which was to be beſieged; and the moment they received the intelligence of the *French* being landed, deſponding, they concluded it was taken; otherways the firſt inattention might have been metamorphoſed from incapacity to wiſdom, from diſgrace to honour, from loſs to advantage, from cenſure to applauſe. All the ſtates of *Europe* would have believed the firſt behaviour, as deſigned to obtain the ſecond advantage; and, converting an egregious imbecility into a refined ſtratagem, conceived highly of that

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policy, which is now univerſally deſpiſed and exploded. But, alas! the ſame ſaturnine planet rules our m——rs alike arbitrarily, at all hours and on all occaſions; their genius tending eternally to the center, like a ſtone thrown into a cavern tells you by every ſtroke, that it ſinks nearer to the abyſs of waters, in which it flounces at laſt and is no more heard of.

The error which had been committed in not ſending ſuccours at firſt, improved by ſending an inſufficient force under Mr *Byng*, was ſtill continued by neglecting to ſend a reinforcement, which would probably have joined him before he reached *Gibraltar*; at leaſt a ſhip might have carried intelligence to *Corunna*; and as the winds were adverſe for the ſquadron, a courier would have reached *Gibraltar* before the fleet, and detained it till he was joined by a further force.

Notwithſtanding this, Mr *Byng* was ſuffered to proceed with ten ſhips of the line, and the chance of meeting Mr *Edgecombe*, 13 in all againſt 12 *French* ſail of equal force to relieve *Minorca*; whilſt Mr *Osburn*, with 15 ſail of the line, remained at *Spithead*, and 10 in the harbour of *Portſmouth*.

At length, after long delays from adverſe winds, Mr *B—g* arrives on the 20th of *May* within ſight of *Minorca* and the enemy's fleet. Imagine then, what muſt be the joy which fired the heart of the old gallant *Blakeney* at the ſight of the *B——ſh* fleet: warmed with all the ſpirit of a true ſubject, he now cheriſhed the fond hopes of obtaining glory to himſelf, honour to his maſter, and intereſt to his country, by this ſuccour which he ſaw, in defeating the enemy's fleet, and rendering all the *French* ſchemes abortive; ſuch, probably, was the pleaſing entertainment of his mind, when the *B——ſh* flag appeared in ſight.

But, alas! Mr *B——g*, after having attacked the *French* ſquadron, with not a man killed or wounded on board his own and many other ſhips; with but 48 killed, and 168 wounded in the whole ſquadron, retires unattempting to relieve the garriſon of *Mahon*, becauſe the *Intrepid* had her fore top-maſt ſhot away, and leaves

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the brave general and his companions cooped within the garriſon of *St. Philip's*, quite deſtitute of all hopes of relief.

Judge then, what was the horror of this brave man's mind, when he firſt knew the behaviour of our fleet, and ſaw all his expectations of relief and honour reduced to air; deſerted in this manner by the *B——ſh* navy, he was yet ſuſtained by himſelf; his heart felt the behaviour of Mr *B—g* with more anguiſh than the neceſſity of being obliged to capitulate; he defended the citadel to the laſt, and then gave it up reluctantly to your enemies. If you have yet the faculties of human nature, weep over the ſevere fate of that brave man, and the ſacrifice of your neglected fellow-countrymen! Pay that tribute to the remembrance of their bravery, though ye are denied arms to revenge their loſs; then call to mind by whoſe conduct they have periſhed.

Reſolve me then, thoſe who daily ſuck the vital blood of *E——d*, and vociferate in defence of m——l conduct, whence did it ſpring, that the number of the enemy's fleet, which in the beginning was known to all, was ſtill unknown to the m——rs? Why a ſuperior force was not ſent to deſtroy them? And why, when *French* forces were landed at *Minorca*, and the number of the ſquadron acknowledged to be twelve, that a reinforcement was not immediately ſent after Mr. *Byng*, yet to fruſtrate the *French* attempts, deſtroy the fleet, and ſtarve or take priſoners marſhal *Richelieu* and his whole army? Tell me, ye who are hired or ſhare in the ſpoiling your country for ſuch purpoſes; tell me, ——or is this behaviour ſo heinous, that even *ye* are dumb, and aſhamed to vindicate your m—— l maſters?

How then are thoſe oppoſite manners of m——l proceeding, with reſpect to *Germany* and *Minorca*, reconcileable with the intereſt of *G——t B——n*, and the duty of a *B——ſh* m——r; why was *H——r* fortified and ſecured by treaties with *Ruſſians*, *Pruſſians*, *Heſſians*, and *Holſteiners*, purchaſed by profuſion of *E——ſh* treaſure? *H——r*, which has already proved ſo fatal in exhauſting the riches of *E——d*; and *Minorca*, though not the

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ſource of your wealth, the protection of it when drawn from other fountains, totally diſregarded? what reaſon can be aſſigned for this inverted behaviour, but that having laviſhed millions in conſequence of thoſe treaties, and the ſafeguard of *German* dominions, there remained not ſupplies ſufficient to protect *Minorca:* this, tho' the moſt profligate, would have been ſome excuſe; but theſe men are yet more unnatural and abandoned; they have fattened a ſpurious race with your heritage, and ſtarved their legitimate offspring; whilſt (from authority it is pronounced) your annual p——y ſupplies were vigorous and effectual.

Have they then thus diſreſpectfully treated you, that the ſources of your wealth from commerce, being diminiſhed by the loſs of *Mahon*, your declining ſtate may ſooner introduce poverty, with dejection her companion, and adapt your ſouls to the wearing, with tranquillity, thoſe chains which the m——l poſſpolite is forging for you? or, that your protection being deſtroyed againſt the *Barbary* corſairs, your honeſt ſailors may fall a prey to that remorſeleſs crew, and, learning there, teach at their return, that being yet one degree above the ſlaves of *Barbary*, you have not equal right to deplore your fate, and thus ſoothe ye to contentment?

Fatal as this may prove to this once happy country, culpable as the ad——l may appear in the eyes of all *Europe*, diſgraceful as it is to the *B——ſh* arms, and diſhonourable to the crown of theſe realms, are not thoſe who delayed the ſuccours at firſt, thoſe who left that neglect unremedied, by ſending an inſufficient force, and even providing againſt that ſecond error by a reinforcement, yet infinitely more the objects of your reſentment? ſpeaking like men, not blinded with the reigning maladies of arrogance and ſelf-ſufficiency, but from the experience of former times, what expectations could be reaſonably entertained, that ten *E——ſh* ſhips of inferior force, or even when joined by Mr *Edgecombe*'s ſquadron, that equal powers would have had a more than equal chance of victory; or that the event would prove leſs favourable to the enemy than the *Engliſh*. Such imaginations

ginations in favour of their countrymen may be laudable, and of ſervice in the common ſailor and common ſoldier, but in the man who is to appoint fleets and commanders, fooliſh, culpable, and deſtructive.

Let it be imagined, however, that the *B* —— *ſh* fleet, with this equality of force, could have conquered the *French*; was it reaſonable to believe the victory would have been ſo cheaply purchaſed, and our ſhips ſo little damaged by the engagement, as to keep the ſeas and relieve *Minorca?* as it probably would not, and as both fleets were equally excluded from the harbour of *Mahon*, would not a conqueſt over the *French* ſquadron have been even then attended with the loſs of the citadel and iſland? To what realm could the *E*——*ſh* fleet have ſteered to find materials to repair the injuries of the battle? Would *Spain* have ſupplied them with naval ſtores, and indulged them to refit in *Carthagena?* No man the leaſt acquainted with the preſent diſpoſitions of that court believes they would; probably then, conſidering the preſent ſtate of *Lisbon*, *Plymouth* is the firſt hoſpitable harbour that could have afforded them aſſiſtance.

If a victory then, of ſuch a nature as the above, would have prevented the fleet of *E*——*d* from keeping the ſeas and ſuccouring *Minorca*, how much leſs likely is it, that effectual relief would have been the conſequence of a drawn battle, or a defeat on our ſide? Does it not appear then too evident, that no ſucceſs, which good ſenſe has a right to expect with ſuch parity of force, could have relieved the citadel of *St. Philip*, or juſtified the m——rs in ſending out ſo ſmall a ſquadron for the defence of ſo important an object?

Whatever then may prove the event of this engagement to the admiral, let not the depravity of his behaviour ſeduce your attention from thoſe who ſent him ſo unequal to the undertaking. If after a candid and deliberate examination, it ſhall appear, that he has been egregiouſly remiſs in his duty to his king and country at the hour of battle; conſider how much more thoſe are delinquent, who delayed the expedition and ſent him at laſt with inſufficient force. There are men, when ſu-

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perior to their enemies, who wear the outſide of gallantry and ſucceed, who perhaps, when on equal terms, from confeſſing ſome inward ſenſations of danger, may retire and miſcarry; if it was his duty to have riſqued every thing in preſervation of *Mahon*, was it leſs obligatory on them, by a ſuperior fleet, to have prevented all probable preſumption of miſcarriage? After all, if Mr *B—g*'s ſpirit proved in the experiment inferior to that of the enemy, was not the armament which the m——r gave him to command, inferior to that of the *French* alſo? on what account was the *B—ſh* fleet obliged to riſque the loſs of victory and *Minorca*, by engaging on equal Terms, when by being double that number, it might have preſerved the iſland, and triumphed over your adverſaries? Whence does it ariſe then, that if the marine m——r is by nature and capacity adapted to the duty of his high office, that a man ſo obviouſly unequal to the task was ſelected to command the fleet of *E——d*, and a fleet ſo inferior to the duty ſent to protect *Mahon?*

Whatever delinquency may then be imagined to have been committed on this account, are not the m——rs ſtill more criminal? The braveſt man on earth, by exerting every ſuperior faculty of the human mind, deſtined and appointed to command a fleet of that force, might only more conſpicuouſly have manifeſted the inſufficiency of the m——l proviſion and judgment, in the conducting this affair; and proved, that though victory ſhould have crowned his arms, that the ſhattered condition of his ſhips would have rendered it impoſſible to preſerve *Mahon*; whereas the m——rs had it in their power, by augmenting the force of the fleet, not only to have prevented diſgrace, but to have commanded ſucceſs, ſaved *Minorca*, defeated their enemies, and crowned themſelves, the ad——l, their king and country with immortal honour.

Yet if you ask why more ſhips were not diſpatched to the ſuccour of *Minorca*, they anſwer, no more were manned ready for the ſeas. Was it then through want of power or pecuniary ſupplies, that this deficiency aroſe? not from the firſt, becauſe that they exert in a more deſpotic manner than is known in the moſt arbitrary ſtates

of *Europe*, in impreſſing ſeamen; not from the ſecond, becauſe no oppoſition in p——t has delayed one moment the levying what money the m——r pleaſed: if to this they ſhall add, that the kingdom cannot furniſh ſailors to mann the fleet with more expedition, and that a large number of men of war are neceſſary for channel ſervice, and to prevent invaſions on this iſland, and therefore a greater force could not be ſent to the *Mediterranean*; ask how it was done the laſt war? and why, in the p——t of 1755, when all this that has followed, and much more was apprehended, a militia bill was neglected to be paſſed? this would have permitted the m——r to have deſtined your fleet to uſeful enterprizes, and cleared *Spithead* from flying pendants, and the uſeleſs parade of a large navy without application or advantage. This would have ſaved you millions of money, and ſecured your ſhores from every hoſtile attack, more effectually than all the ſhips built ſince the ark, or Argo which ſet ſail with admiral *Jaſon* to fetch the golden fleece from *Colchos*.

If then the ſouls of our m——rs are in uniſon with their country's good, why did they delay and reject this neceſſary duty to their king and their fellow ſubjects?

Let then the word *militia* be eternally halloo'd in their ears; may their imaginations awake, and ſleeping be haunted with this terrifying neglect; may this idea be ever preſent to their minds, the ghoſt of that bleſſing which they ſtrangled, 'till, alarmed by dread, and guilt, they repent and arm this defenceleſs land.

To what region is now fled all that panegyric, which was ſo loudly ſounded through the kingdom, of diſpatch, diligence, and capacity, in the m——e m——r? Why were thoſe ſhips ſo expeditiouſly equipt, ſo ineffectually deſtined and applied? What injury has this hurry and expence brought on your enemies, or what advantage to this nation, unleſs the private gains of a few thouſands, and the infamous appellation of thieves and pyrates from your enemies, unanſwered by your m——rs, are conceived an adequate recompence for the national expence of millions, and the loſs of character through all the realms of *Europe*.

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The baſeleſs fabric of his temple of fame then is vaniſhed; the deſerted proprietor of that ſhort lived glare of reputation is now ſunk into rayleſs obſcurity, like the bliſs of ſome poor cottager, who from his dream of millions wakes amidſt the pangs of penury; happy for this iſle, could the fatal effects of his male-adminiſtration vaniſh with the unmerited reputation of the author.

Egregiouſly delinquent as the m——rs have proved themſelves in this neglect of *Minorca*, with what accumulated guilt ought they to be viewed, when the recapitulation of their whole conduct comes to be conſidered by you.

If thoſe who have loſt *Mahon*, and permitted your gallant countrymen in hopeleſs defence to fall the guiltleſs ſacrifices of their neglect, the unavailing yet auguſt victims of their own and country's honour, objects worthy of your admiration and affliction, the eternal ſtigma of an unnatural ad———n, have ruined your trade in the *Mediterranean*, ſubjected your ſailors to the captures and ſlavery of *Barbary* pirates, by this one miſconduct, what will be the whole event of the aggregate of their imbecillity, when by wrong choice of commanders in *America*, and inattention to that valuable part of *B—ſh* poſſeſſions, many provinces are left open to hoſtile inroad. May not the *French*, who have been ſome time ſending troops to the *Miſſiſſippi*, this ſummer become maſters of *Georgia* and *Carolina*, ſo defenceleſs and open; or perhaps ſome province more lucrative and better adapted to the neceſſities of *Faance*.

What have you to expect from your boaſted naval bulwark, if the ſame men continue to direct it, who have already laviſhed in ineffectual deſtination and inſufficient force ſo many millions? Have the *French* expeditions been rendered abortive in one inſtance? Have the captures of their ſhips of war exceeded three, equal to our loſs only?

In like manner, behold what have been the fatal conſequences of their tranſactio in *Europe*; treaties, ruinous to *E———d*, partial to *H——— r*, and yet deſtructive to the welfare of that ſtate; deſertion of old allies and

more potent friendſhips, for connections with weaker and more needy powers; profuſion of public money to hireling mercenaries, national degradation and contempt in foreign eyes, imputation of diſloyalty or cowardice on yourſelves, whilſt you are denied the uſe of arms to defend yourſelves, your wives, and daughters from open enemies, and the ſacrilegious hands of venal foreigners, nurtured by your own money, brought on pretended terms of hoſpitality, if they ſhould dare to treat you with inſolence.

In the mean time, your fellow-ſubjects, ſeduced into the army by promiſes of being liſted for three years, and to defend their country only, are kidnapped, and forced on board ſhip by compulſion, treated and tranſported like ſlaves, God knows where; to return, God knows when *.

Is it not poſſible then, that by continuing to increaſe the number of inſolent foreigners, and ſending out the native troops, that at length a ſtanding army of the former may become too formidable to be oppoſed by the people of *G—t B——n*, diſarmed as ye are? Or even by the military thus daily decreaſing by tranſportation to diſtant parts of the world, if at length they ſhould reſent the want of confidence which is manifeſted by thus relying on *H————ns* and *H——-ns*, in preference to that loyal body of men.

Who then can wonder, if from one continued ſeries of miſtakes, and flagrant manifeſtations of m——l incapacity, the *Swedes* ſhould ſnatch this golden opportunity of repoſſeſſing *Bremen* and *Verden*, the *Auſtrians Sileſia*, the *Spaniards Gibraltar*, and the *French*, after having

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Extract of a letter from Plymouth, *dated* May 21.

Yeſterday morning col. *Campbell*'s new-raiſed regiment was reviewed in the field, and ordered to appear at four o'clock in the afternoon on the dock, without arms; which they accordingly did, and, without much difficulty, marched into the dock-yard, followed to the gates by the garriſon, with their bayonets fixed, and muskets loaded, to keep guard while they were again reviewed by general *Home*, the colonel, and admiral *Meſtyn*; after which the companies were divided, and a ſignal-gun being fired from the admiral's ſhip, for all the boats to attend, they were immediately embarked without any diſturbance, except heavy complaints at their being ſent abroad, contrary to the terms of the advertiſement, and the promiſes made them at the time of their inliſting.

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ſecured *Minorca* to themſelves, invade the kingdom of *Ireland*: and, to cloſe the whole, ranſack this very iſland of *G—t B——n?*

Have not the treaty with *Pruſſia*, and deſertion of *Auſtrian* intereſt, laid a probable foundation for the *Swedes* and *Germans* to accompliſh the two former? Will not the ſuffering *Mahon* to be taken, and yielding up that harbour to the *French*, encourage the *Spaniard* to attempt the third? and *France* having no farther object for her fleet in the *Mediterranean*, unite and employ all her force in perpetrating the fourth?

Will then the actual poſſeſſion of ſome, and nearer proſpect of ſubduing all theſe places, permit the m——l gang to raiſe the ſupplies for the enſuing year? Will thoſe who have aſſiſted the m——y, through the lucrative view of private intereſt, lend them their money when the danger of loſing all exceeds the poſſibility of the profit? Then will it not too evidently appear, when bankruptcy, diſtreſs, and anarchy are let looſe, that the unlimited profuſion of *E—ſh* gold for *German* intereſt has at length brought that inundation of evils, ſo long predicted, on this deplorable country?

Who then are friends, and who your foes? What are thoſe men who dare to impute diſloyalty to ſubjects, whoſe words and actions would have contributed to ſave this ſinking ſtate, if their counſel had been followed? ſhall the tracing a *Scotch* renegado jeſuit through all his doubling lies and fallacies, to prevent future impoſition on a few, by the diſcovery, be (as it ought) deemed a laudable and honeſt purſuit; and yet the unravelling the miſchiefs which m——rs have brought on a whole nation, and attempting to reſcue it from their impious hands, be blaſted with the appellation of a libel? Be not, like individual atoms playing in the ſun-beams, detached from one another, whirl'd to and fro, as the breath of m——l conduct blows amongſt ye. Let the general good, like the general attraction, hold ye firm to what ye owe yourſelves and country; otherwiſe, to what purpoſe do ye curſe the a——l that forſook the cauſe of king and country, and praiſe the gallant *Blakeney* who never

never deſerted his truſt? Why do ye importunately ask, will the *Spaniards* join the *French* to attack *Gibraltar?* Will the *French* invade this kingdom? Alas! neither imprecation nor panegyric, the taking or defence of *Gibraltar*, or even the coming of the *French*, can bring a greater though a more ſudden evil on your condition. Nothing can long relieve or ſave this nation: if the ſame rulers in the cabinet continue to preſide, ye need no foreign enemy to make ye ſlaves. Can ye conceive that the ſame men who have brought ruin on your affairs, have either inclination or abilities to reinſtate them in their former happy ſituation? inquiſitive but ſenſeleſs of your fate, your ſouls ſeem to have loſt all thoſe virtuous and quick ſenſations, which have hitherto been the inſeparable companions of a free ſtate.

To what purpoſe then, when all remedies muſt come too late, will this predicted ruin be believed by you? What will then avail that anguiſh, when you curſe your deſtroyers and your own inattention? perhaps accompanied with this imbittering reflexion, that thoſe whom ye aſſiſted to ruin you have bound your hands in chains, and are become the arbitrary maſters of the kingdom. Unleſs then ye ſuddenly awake from this trance into which ye are fallen, your foreign or domeſtic enemies will prevent ye, and then ye muſt ſleep the ſleep of death, *England* is no more!

However deſtructive therefore this action of Mr *B—g* may appear on enquiry, remember, before it be too late, once more I charge you to examine whether the original authors of that evil are not infinitely more criminal? If it ſhall be found, that his conduct has in one inſtance entailed diſgrace on this kingdom, let it be ſeen whether the m——rs have not, by numberleſs and repeated acts, almoſt overwhelmed the land with infamy; nay though he ſhould be condemned for want of courage, will it not be juſt to enquire whether, if thoſe men have, with unwearied diligence, depreciated every virtue, and ſapped every honourable motive of the human ſoul, given power and honours to riches only, and neglected all

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degrees of merit; this very imputation of want of reſolution may not equitably be aſcribed to them alſo?

Is it then a wonder, that men in all ranks, corrupted in head and heart, ſhould be unequal to the tasks which honour only can inſpire, and virtue accompliſh? Remember then, if Mr *B—g* be doomed to puniſhment, to which it is not improbable he may, as a ſcape-goat offered to your reſentment for the ſalvation of the m——rs, that this can avail nothing in your favour. Will not the ſame deficiency of judgment ſtill operate in the choice of commanders and deſtination of expeditions, whilſt the direction remains in the ſame hand? What expectation have ye by his removal, that your national affairs will wear a better face, or raiſe the fallen condition of this ſinking land?

Will it not then be ſtrictly equitable, that the ſame voice which calls Mr *B—g* to a candid examination of his conduct, ſhould ſummon alſo thoſe who have ſo long and ſo fatally ſuperintended the direction of national affairs to an impartial enquiry, that ye be aſcertained why the territories of *England* on the *Ohio* were ſhamefully conceded to the *French*; to whom, and to what purpoſes, your millions have been laviſhed, whether to the ruin or advantage of this iſland; on what account *Mahon* and *America* were neglected, and *H——r* preferred to all; and from what cauſe it happens, that ſix millions and a half in the laſt year of queen *Anne*'s reign, could ſuffice for the intereſt of fifty millions, and the ſupport of a vigorous war; that now twelve millions, when the annual expence of the debt, by the diminiſhed intereſt of money, exceeds not what it was at that time, are not equal to the annual extravagance of the m——rs, or productive of one victory?

In her reign, though your treaſures were exhauſted, and your fellow-ſubjects ſlaughtered for *German* intereſts, ye ſuſtained the flattering character of a brave and honeſt people amongſt the nations, and were, by the ſuperb victories which your general obtained, honoured and revered; but under the direction of theſe inauſpicious m——rs, ye live without renown, and die without victory,

victory, ſtigmatized with the infamous brand of thieves and pyrates, by that nation which then dared not to look ye in the face: Shameful alternative!

Notwithſtanding this, if before a juſt tribunal the tranſactions of the m——rs ſhall be found both honourable and upright, and the approaching fate of *B——n* owing to theſe irreſiſtable cauſes, by which all nations periſh, and to which they are not acceſſary, they will then like ſouls paſſed through Purgatory to Paradiſe, riſe from calumny to approbation, from hatred to eſteem, from pain to pleaſure. What then can be more acceptable to men of integrity, than ſuch an enquiry? But if through the evidence of truth, they ſhall ſtand convicted of male-adminiſtration, let no malevolence preſume to draw compariſons between the conduct of paſſed m——rs who have ſuffered, and the preſent who have not, or attempt increaſing the heinouſneſs of their actions, by truly ſtating thoſe of the ſufferers: for the ſake of theſe who are yet alive, I wiſh you never to recal the decapitation of lord *Strasford*, or compare his and their conduct. Revenge is criminal, it is unworthy a *Briton*; if the love of your country muſt make ye feel the paſſions to which human nature is ſubjected, remember, though ye are men, that ye are Chriſtians alſo; and, notwithſtanding the ruin of this land is well nigh completed, implore your ſ——n to afford thoſe enemies to his realm that mercy which they have ever denied his innocent people; and when he ſhall graciouſly preſerve them from condign puniſhment, that he will mercifully caſt an eye of pity alſo on millions of his faithful ſubjects, and ſave them from perdition, by at once removing from his preſence, the ſpoilers of the dignity of his crown, and liberties of his ſubjects; keep then your eyes and attention ſteadily on your prince, from him expect relief; there remains yet one method by which ye may all be ſaved.

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